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RETHINKING DERIVATIVE RIGHTS*
Naomi Abe Voegtlit
INTRODUCTION
Copyrighted works are increasingly turning into "raw
materials" that we use to engage in expressive activities. To-
day, children become acquainted with Barney and Big Bird
through television shows, videos, books, songs, and toys, even
before they learn to walk.' As children learn to express them-
selves, they incorporate these characters into their creative
activities just like they incorporate other familiar objects, such
as dogs, cats, and flowers. The importance of copyrighted
works does not decrease as we grow older.2 In fact, we contin-
ue to use them in various expressive activities3
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1 The copyright industries use licensing to exploit commercial potentials of
popular characters, such as Barney. K. P. Dunleavy, License To Publish. Rights
Deals Between Book Publishers And Licensed Brand Names Are An Increasingly
Lucrative Part of The Industry, PUBLISHERS WKLY., Feb. 20, 1995, at 126 (quoting,
from The Licensing Letter, that retail sales from book-related licenses are about
$1.5 billion a year). While Barney is a relatively new comer to the licensing mar-
ket, Beatrix Potter, one of the biggest and oldest literary licenses that dates back
to 1903, racks up $500 million in annual earnings. Id.
2 See MARSHAL MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS OF MAN
63-80 (1964) (recognizing that modern means of mass reproduction have shaped
our consciousness besides entertaining us); Henry Jenkins m, Start Trel. Rerun,
Reread, Rewritten: Fan Writing as Textual Poaching, in CLOSE ENCOUNTERS: FILM,
FEM1ISM AND SCIENCE FICTION 171, 172-73 (Constance Penley et al. eds., 1991)
(observing that pop culture fans passionately embrace favored texts and attempt to
integrate media representations within their own social experience).
' See, e.g., Rosemary J. Coombe, Authorizing the Celebrity: Publicity Rights,
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The new digital technology has made it easier to "raw
materialize" copyrighted works. For instance, instead of scis-
sors and glue, I could use a computer and scanner to reproduce
a perfect digital copy of Mickey Mouse, transform it by chang-
ing its clothes and facial expression, and place it against a
digital copy of my favorite painting. By payink a modest
monthly fee to an Internet service provider, I could publish my
work without going through a publisher and potentially reach
millions of people.4 Others could reproduce my work and freely
modify it. Moreover, I could create a global forum to share
experiences and thoughts using Mickey Mouse as a communi-
cation medium. Not surprisingly, the World Wide Web ("Web")
is already filled with individuals who engage in expressive
activities by appropriating copyrighted works.5
Appropriation has been an integral part of creative process
well before the arrival of the digital technology.6 For example,
Andy Warhol became known for works that appropriate famil-
iar images, such as a Campbell's soup can and Brillo box.7
Marcel Duchamp made sculptures out of "ready-made"8 objects
with little alterations.9 In a critically acclaimed novel, The
Postmodern Politics, and Unauthorized Genders, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
365, 366 (1992) (arguing that media images have become integral part of creative
and political expressions of individuals); Margaret Chon, Postmodern Progress":
Reconstructing the Copyright and Patent Power, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 97 (1993).
' The size of Internet population in 1996 is estimated to be somewhere be-
tween 16.7 million and 27.2 million. TIME DIGITAL, Mar. 10, 1997, at 8. The
Internet population is expected to at least double by the year 2000. Id.
The Sticky Business of Web Sites; A New 'Me Generation" Is Abusing Copy-
rights and Trademarks, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1996, at B8.
6 Alexander Lindey gives examples of plagiarism found in many famous works
created before the mid-twentieth century. ALEXANDER LINDEY, PLAGIARISM AND
ORIGINALITY 62-230 (1952). See also Judith Gaines, Of Copyrights and Copycats;
The Famous Have Often Plagiarized-And Been Cheered For It, BOSTON GLOBE,
Nov. 27, 1988, at A21. For the development of appropriative arts, see John Carlin,
Culture Vultures: Artistic Appropriation and Intellectual Property Law, 13 COLUM.-
VLA J.L. & ARTS 103, 103-04, 108-111 (1988); E. Kenly Ames, Beyond Rogers v.
Koons: A Fair Use Standard for Appropriation, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1473, 1477-80
(1993).
R. CRONE, ANDY WARHOL (1970).
8 "Ready-made" is the term Duchamp invented for his Dada sculptures, which
consisted entirely of readily available commercial goods. Carlin, supra note 6, at
109 n.18.
9 Duchamp's most famous works include a sculpture of a bicycle wheel mount-
ed on a stool, entitled "Roue de Bicyclette" and a painting entitled "L.H.O.O.Q.P.",
which is a copy of "Mona Lisa" with a mustache. See generally WALTER HoPPs ET
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White Hotel, D. M. Thomas copied verbatim a testimony of a
single survivor of the Babi Yar slaughter from a book called
Babi Yar written by a Russian writer Anatoli Kuznetsov.0
Herman Melville copied portions of Benito Cereno from A Nar-
rative of Voyages and Travels in the Northern and Southern
Hemispheres by a little-known writer, Amasa Delano."1 Both
T. S. Eliot and William Shakespeare are well known for taking
phrases from various sources.'2 In fact, some commentators
argue that appropriation has been an integral part of creative
process throughout the history."
Furthermore there is ample evidence that suggests that
an image of a great author as someone who creates a truly
original work in a solitary environment is nothing but a myth.
Prior to the Romantic Era, authors were seen as mere crafts-
men or stenographers of the Divine Spirit, who simply tran-
scribed what had already existed. 4 Hence, works existed
without attribution to authors and were free to be used and
reused by others.'" Even today, one study of creative writing
shows that:
Mhe traditional model of solitary authorship is more myth than
reality, that much of most of the writing produced in professional
AL., MARCEL DUCHAMP: READY-LOES, ETC. (1913-1964) (1964).
10 The publisher of Babi Yar never went to court or brought any pressure to
bear on Thomas or on this publisher. ALvIN KERNAN, THE DEATH OF LITERATURE
120 (1990). Among literary circles, there was little "explicit" criticism of Thomas's
conduct. Id.
" Most critics, however, concluded that Melville transformed Delano's rather
ordinary narrative into a work of genius. See Gaines, supra note 6.
' See LINDEY, supra note 6, at 74-75; KENNETH MUIR, THE SOURCES OF
SHAKESPEARE'S PLAYS (1978); RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND IrERATURE: A MISuii-
DERSTOOD RELATION 338-349 (1988) (illustrating how Shakespeare and T. S. Eliot
transformed Sir Thomas North's translation of Plutarch).
See, e.g., James Boyle, The Search for an Author: Sha.espeare and the
Framers, 37 AM U. L. REV. 625 (1988) [hereinafter Boyle, Search for Author];
KERNAN, supr note 10.
1" See, e.g., Boyle, Search for Author, at 628-33; KERNAN, supra note 10, at
110.
"1 See, eg., Max W. Thomas, Reading and Writing the Renaissance Common.
place Book: A Question of Authorship2, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 665 (1992)
(describing a "commonplace book" during the Renaissance era, in which a variety
of poetic texts from different poets were gathered without attribution; also stating
that texts of poems in commonplace books "remained highly variable in the sense
that a later hand was free to alter it, improve it, and/or incorporate it in unrelat-
ed poems"); EARNST P. GOLDSCHmIDT, MEDIEVAL TEXTS AND THEIR FRST APPEAR-
ANCE IN PRINT (1943) (describing writing practices in the Medieval era).
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settings in America is done collaboratively, and that, in fact, much
of what is called "creative" writing is collaborative as well, though it
also always flies under the banner of single authorship."6 In Ed-
ward Young's words, "[slo few are our originals, that if all other
books were burnt, the lettered world would resemble some metropo-
lis in flames, where a few incombustible buildings-a fortress, a
temple, a tower-lift their heads in melancholy grandeur, amid the
mighty ruin."
17
Despite the importance of appropriation in creative process, it
is generally prohibited under the Copyright Act of 19761" ("the
1976 Act") unless an appropriated work either belongs to the
public domain or is licensed from its copyright owner. In the
next section, I review cases that deal with appropriative art.
These cases show that an artist who appropriates a copyright-
ed work is often found liable for copyright infringement, even
when the artist takes only a small amount of a copyrighted
work, transforms it considerably before incorporating it, and
produces a critically acclaimed work."8
Given the importance of appropriation in various fields of
art and other expressive activities, current copyright law
seems, at least, counter-intuitive. To explain how an act of ap-
propriation has become an act of stealing under copyright law,
this Article briefly traces the evolution of Anglo-American
copyright law since its birth in 1709,0 focusing on the devel-
opment of derivative rights. I then evaluate various theories
given in support of derivative rights and conclude that broad
derivative rights under the current copyright system: (1) inhib-
it socially beneficial creative activities; (2) result in a reward
system in which the size of the reward has little to do with the
amount of labor put in to create the work; (3) grant protection
against exploitive use even for works with little personality
interest; (4) ignore the true nature of authorship; (5) limit
16 Andrea A. Lunsford & Lisa Ede, Collaboratiue Authorship and the Teaching
of Writing, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 681, 682 (1992).
"' LINDEY, supra note 6, at 14 (quoting EDWARD YOUNG, CONJECTURES ON
ORIGINAL CoiviposrION (1759)). Lindey states that "[hlistorically viewed, all artistic
creativity is related and interdependent, continuous and cumulative. Every work,
past and present, is but a link in the chain." LINDEY, supra note 6, at 273.Is 17 U.S.C. § 101 inclusive sections (1994).
19 One small exception to this general rule are works of parody, for which the
courts excuse appropriation as fair use. See infra Part I.C.
20 The Statute of Anne, 8 Anne c. 19 (1709) (giving authors and their assigns
the exclusive right to "print, reprint, or import" their books).
1216 [Vol. 63:1213
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democratic discourse; and (6) frustrate people's reasonable
expectations with respect to copyrighted works. I then explore
three alternatives for restricting derivative rights: (1) the use
of compulsory licensing; (2) the application of the fair use doc-
trine to an appropriative use; and (3) the revision of the defini-
tion of a "derivative work." I conclude that the last alternative
is most desirable in terms of achieving the ultimate goal of
copyright law, that is to "promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts."'
I. APPROPRIATIVE WORKS UNDER THE 1976 COPYRIGHT ACT
An artist who engages in appropriative art faces a threat
of copyright infringement liability under the theory that her
work infringes copyright owner's reproduction or derivative
rights.' The artist will be found liable for copyright infringe-
ment if the copyright owner establishes that the artist copied
her work and that this copying resulted in substantial similari-
ties between expressions of two works.'
In analyzing copyright infringement cases involving deriv-
ative works, I include those cases in which courts found a work
in violation of reproduction rights instead of derivative rights.
This is because there seems to be some overlap between these
two rights. For example, when a defendant makes a statue by
copying a plaintiff's two-dimensional work, some consider it a
violation of reproduction rights rather than derivative
rights.' Hence, I consider cases in which an accused infringer
21 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
" Under the 1976 Act, exclusive rights of copyright owners include right 'to
reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords" and "to prepare deriva-
tive works based upon the copyrighted work 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994). For examples
of copyright liabilities faced by appropriate artists, see Carlin, supra note 6, at
126-140.
To prevail in a copyright infringement action, plaintiff must prove both (1)
that defendant copied from plaintiffs copyrighted work and (2) that the copying
(assuming it to be proved) went so far as to constitute improper appropriation.
Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946).
24 2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW & PRACTICE 825-26 (1994). Professor
Patry states that copying of a work into a different medium should be considered
as violating derivative rights, although many courts deal with copying in the re-
production right context. Id. See, e.g., Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 506 U.S. 934 (1992); Warner Bros., Inc. v. ABC, 654 F.2d 204 (2d
Cir. 1981).
199'7] 1217
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appropriated a copyrighted work in order to create a "new"
work regardless of whether reproduction or derivative rights
were involved.'
A. Derivative Rights: In General
The 1976 Act defines a "derivative work" broadly:
A "derivative work" is a work based upon one or more pre-existing
works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization,
fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art repro-
duction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a
work may be recast, transformed, or adopted. A work consisting of
editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications
which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a
"derivative work.""
Thus, any work that incorporates a portion of a copyrighted
work in some form presumably falls within the statutory defi-
nition of a "derivative work."
1. The Originality Requirement
Courts disagree on whether a work must be independently
copyrightable to be considered a "derivative work."'" The
Ninth Circuit held that a party bringing a copyright action for
an alleged infringement of its exclusive rights to create deriva-
tive works need not show originality in an alleged derivative
work.' The Second Circuit, however, states that an alleged
Professor Goldstein proposes the line between the reproduction right and the
derivative right be drawn at the "point at which the contribution of independent
expression to an existing work effectively creates a new work for a different mar-
ket." Paul Goldstein, Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 J.
COPYRIGHT SOcY 209, 217 (1983).
26 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
'z The Supreme Court made originality a constitutional requirement for copy-
right protection. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Serv. Co., 499 U.S.
340, 345 (1991) (holding that a white page telephone directory that lists names of
all service subscribers in an alphabetical order failed to meet originality require-
ment and thus not copyrightable). The standard of originality required is low. Id.
at 362.
2 Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of America, Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 967-68 (9th
Cir. 1992). When a party is seeking a copyright for a derivative work, even the
Ninth Circuit requires a showing of originality. Id. Commentators have criticized
the Ninth Circuit's dual definition. For example, Melvin Nimmer questioned a
district court decision in Mirage Edition, Inc. v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 856 F.2d
[Vol. 63: 1213
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derivative work must contain sufficient creativity and origi-
nality to be deemed to infringe derivative rights." In other
words, a work that itself is not independently copyrightable
can constitute a derivative work for a purpose of a copyright
infringement action in the Ninth Circuit but not in the Second
Circuit.
As a result, an appropriator who is in a business of selling
a slightly altered version of a copyrighted work that she pur-
chased would face an uncertain future in a copyright infringe-
ment suit. Under the Ninth Circuit definition of a derivative
work, even a trivial alteration would result in a derivative
work, and thus the appropriator would be deemed to infringe
derivative rights.0 In contrast, under the Second Circuit defi-
nition, the appropriator would escape copyright infringement
liability under the first sale doctrine,3' as long as her alter-
ation does not amount to a variation that is enough to satisfy
the originality standard. 2
1341 (9th Cir. 1988), in which the court held that removing reproduction of art
works from a "compilation of selected copyrighted individual art works," and there-
after mounting those reproduction onto ceramic tile, resulted in the creation of de-
rivative work. MELVILLE B. NYMM1ER & DAVID NIMMR, 1 NIM ER ON COPYRIGHT,
§ 3.03 (1996).
Woods v. Bourne Co., 60 F.3d 978, 993 (2d Cir. 1995). See also Lee v. Dec
the Walls, Inc., 925 F. Supp. 576 (N.D. IMI. 1996) (adopting the Second Circuit
definition of a derivative work).
" See, e.g., Mirage Editions, Inc. v. Albuquerque A.PT. Co., 856 F.2d 1341
(9th Cir. 1988) (finding that defendant who sold ceramic tiles with a copyrighted
art print mounted on it infringed plaintiffs copyright in the art print); Munoz v.
Alburquerque A.R.T. Co., 829 F. Supp. 309 (D. Alaska 1993) (defendant, who pur-
chased artist's notecards, mounted the notecards onto ceramic tiles, and distributed
the resulting ceramic tiles, was found liable for copyright infringement); Greenwich
Workshop, Inc. v. Timber Creations, Inc., 932 F. Supp. 1210 (C.D. Cal. 1996)
(granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff by finding that defendant who
matted and framed bookplates infringed plaintiffs copyrights in both the artwork
and the book).
" The first sale doctrine, codified at 17 U.S.C. § 109 (1994), gives a purchaser
of a copyrighted work a right to sell the work. In other words, the doctrine "pro-
vides, in essence, that once the copyright owner has transferred ownership of a
particular copy of the work, the person to whom the copy has been transferred is
entitled to dispose of it by sale, rental, or any other means." Parfums Givenchy v.
C & C Beauty Sales, 832 F. Supp. 1378, 1385 (C.D. Cal. 1993) (citing H.R. REP.
No. 94-1476, 79 (1976)).
1 Lee, 925 F. Supp. at 578-82 (holding that mere mounting of a copyrighted
art print on a ceramic tile did not result in a new and different original work,
and thus was not a derivative work).
19971 1219
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It is important to keep in mind that even under the stan-
dard of the Second Circuit, a Web publisher who posts a
framed version of a copyrighted work would not escape copy-
right infringement liability even if her alteration is not enough
to satisfy the originality requirement. This is because a digital
copy can be reproduced infinitely by anyone who accesses her
Web site. To escape copyright liability, she must have legal
right to each copy distributed over the Web.33
2. The Amount of Copying
Even when an appropriator takes a very small amount of
expression from a copyrighted work, her work may be consid-
ered infringing. For example, in Roth Greeting Cards v. United
Card Company, 4 a defendant's greeting card, which copied
neither the copyrighted text nor copyrighted art work of a
plaintiffs card, was found liable for copyright infringement due
to the similarity in "total concept and feel" of two cards. In
other words, the court found similarity in a "mood" and an
overall arrangement of text and art work.35
Courts have given little guidance as to the quantum of
similarity in the "total concept and feel" necessary to become
liable for copyright infringement. Professor Melvin Nimmer
states that the question in each case is whether the similarity
relates to a matter that constitutes a substantial portion of a
plaintiff's work.3" In answering this question, Professor
Nimmer recommends using the following as the guiding princi-
ple: "If so much is taken, that the value of the original is sensi-
bly diminished, or the labors of the original author are sub-
stantially to an injurious extent appropriated by another, that
is sufficient, in point of law, to constitute a piracy pro tan-
to.""7 As applied to appropriative art, as long as a resulting
' Id. at 582 ("For each tile generated by [defendant], [defendant] must pur-
chase a notecard originally sold by [copyright owner].").
34 429 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1970).
3 Id. at 1110.
6 NMMER, supra note 28, § 13.03[A][2].
NIM ER, supra note 28, §13.03[A][2] (citing Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342,
348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901) (Story, J.).
[Vol. 63:1213
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work does not compete in the same market as the original, an
artist should be able to escape copyright infringement charge
under this principle.
B. Post-Modern Art and Rap Musicem
Appropriation is considered an essential component of a
Post-Modern art expression."9 In fact, appropriation in Post-
Modern art finds its conceptual justification in semiotics,
and its artistic roots in Modernism.4 ' One commentator ex-
plains the significance of appropriation in Post-Modern art as
follows:
The rise of semiotic figuration in late twentieth-century art and
theory must be recognized in order to accept the legitimacy and
social value of Appropriation. To understand Appropriation as tran-
scending re-use or plagiarism one must accept that our social envi-
ronment is increasingly determined by simulated signs, and that the
realm of the "imaginary" has supplanted that of the "real" in deter-
mining our sense of self and nature. As a result, artists now repre-
sent beer cans and coke bottles as readily as they once did apples
and oranges.
The semiotic basis of Post-Modem art is precisely what makes
Appropriation both central to and unavoidable in contemporary
representation. The referent in Post-Modem art is no longer "na-
ture," but the closed system of fabricated signs that make up our
environment. In the nineteenth century realistic painters from
Thomas Cole through Claude Monet strove to accurately represent
nature as it appeared to the eye, divorced from the cultural biases
' Another area where the rights of appropriator and copyright owner often col-
lide is adaptations of a novel into a movie or television series. When transforming
a book into a movie or television series, it is not uncommon that the end product
contains little more than the title and character names of original work. The
courts, however, often find infringement even when a movie or television serie3
has little in common with the book version. See, e.g., Filmvideo Releasing Corp. v.
Hastings, 509 F. Supp. 60 (S.D.N.Y.), (finding infringement based on similarities in
overall mood, message, general theme and total concept).
See Ames, supra note 6, at 1477-80.
Semiotics is the study of meaning and of communication. See generally CLAS-
SICS OF SEiAOTICS (Martin Krampen et al. eds., 1987) (overview of basic semiotic
theory).
41 Modernism is the "aesthetic ideology which has dominated artistic practice in
the west for approximately [1351 years." JOHN A. WALKER, ART IN THE AGE OF
MASS MEDIA 80 (1983). Modernism challenges the traditional notion of originality
and authorship upon which value in fine art typically has been judged by deliber-
ate appropriation of existing art works. Id.
1997] 1221
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that had built up for hundreds of years. In the present century cul-
ture fimctions as the ideal artistic referent. Consequently, contempo-
rary artists like [Jasper] Johns, [Andy] Warhol, or David Salle
should be free to reproduce our "nature," even if some of it is made
from commercial signs and imagery that are protected by copyright
and trademark. Furthermore, society needs artists to comment upon
corporate imagery in order to balance its monopoly over our sense of
social reality."
Direct incorporation of existing works is evident in many criti-
cally acclaimed works by Modern and Post-Modern novelists,
artists, and musicians." In literature, more notable works
include T. S. Eliot's The Wasteland, Ezra Pound's Cantos, and
James Joyce's Ulysses. In music, sampling of copyrighted
works is widely used not only by rap musicians but also by
more "serious" musicians like John Cage.4" In art, Jasper
Johns,46 Marcel Duchamp,47 and Andy Warhol lifted preex-
isting images to create critically acclaimed works. Some Post-
Modern artists express their creativity through the deliberate
copying of a pre-existing work without modification. For exam-
ple, Sherrie Levine, whose work was included in the 1985 bien-
nial at the Whitney Museum of American Art, engages in pho-
tographing of photographs to challenge the assumption of origi-
nality. Levine states that:
The world is filled to suffocating. Man has placed his token on every
stone. Every work, every image is leased and mortgaged. We know
that a picture is but a space in which a variety of images, none of
them original, blend and clash. A picture is at issue of quotations
drawn from the innumerable centers of culture. 8
42 Salle is known for paintings in which an appropriated image is reproduced
many times. Carlin, supra note 6, at 107 n.15.
Carlin, supra note 6, at 110-11.
See generally Carlin, supra note 6, at 103-111; 126-40.
Carlin, supra note 6, at 106 n.14. John Cage was an American composer
who is noted for his unorthodox theories and experimental composition. See gener-
ally DAVID REVILL, THE ROARING SILENCE: A BIOGRAPHY OF JOHN CAGE (1997);
JOHN CAGE & JOAN RETALLACK, CAGE MUSES ON WORDS, ART, MuSic (1996). In
particular, he composed aleatories or "chance" music in which elements are derived
by use of multiple music compositions scored for multiple radios tuned at random.
" Johns pioneered the quotation of pre-existing two-dimensional imagery, such
as flags, targets, numbers, maps, etc., in art. See Carlin, supra note 6, at 110.
See generally HOPPS, supra note 9.
Carlin, supra note 6, at 137-38 (quoting Magazine of the Wardsworth Athe.
naeum 7 (Spring 1987)).
1222 [Vol. 63:1213
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Like Levine, Victor Burgen, John Baldessari, and Richard
Prince became celebrated for rephotoghraphed photographs.
Courts have often equated appropriative art activity to
"stealing," and have not hesitated to find copyright infringe-
ment even when appropriation was consistent with the style of
art practiced by an accused infringer.49 In fact, courts gen-
erally rejected the "artistic style" defense. Admittedly, these
artists could have obtained licensing before they used copy-
righted works. Yet, licensing adds a considerable overhead in
terms of time and money and can be prohibitively expensive
for works that combine bits and pieces from many different
sources. Consequently, copyright law as currently applied by
the courts discourages Post-Modern art, which relies heavily on
appropriation, as illustrated in the following cases.
1. Rogers v. Koons'
Plaintiff an artist-photographer, accused defendant, a
commercially successful sculptor,51 of infinging his copyright
on a photograph entitled "Puppies." Plaintiffs photograph
depicted a husband and wife holding eight German Shepherd
puppies, in black and white. Plaintiff earned a modest compen-
sation through selling, exhibiting, and licensing the photo-
graph. Defendant decided to turn "Puppies" into a sculpture
and mailed a postcard version of "Puppies" to a foundry with
instructions to make a sculpture that would be 'just like" the
photo.52 Defendant made four copies of a sculpture, entitled
"' See, e.g., Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992); Grand Upright Music
Ltd. v. Warner Brothers Records, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
50 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cr. 1992).
5 Jeffrey Koons was known as one of the leading Neo-Geo artists, who appro-
priated a wide variety of commercial images. Carlin, supra note 6, at 126 n.99.
Koons created a series of art works that literally exhibited mass printed commer-
cial advertising as used in the trade, without repainting or collaging them. Carlin,
supra note 6, at 126 n.99. Koons's works 'have been acquired by museums around
the world, including the Museum of Modern Art in New York, and prices for them
exceeded $400,000." Paul Taylor, The Art of P.R., and Vice Versa, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
27, 1991, at B1.
52 In summarizing defendant's creative process, the court emphasized
defendant's detailed instruction given by Koons to the foundry requiring that
"work must be just like photo-features of photo must be captured," including
couple's posture, wife's expression, and appearance of puppies' fur. Rogers, 960
F.2d at 305.
1997]
BROOKLYNLAWREVIEW
"String of Puppies" and sold three of them for $367,000."3 The
forth copy was displayed at the Sonnabend Gallery."
In upholding summary judgment in favor of plaintiff on
the copyright infringement claim, the Second Circuit flatly
rejected defendant's fair use defense.55 The court seemed to
accept the defendant's claim that:
He belongs to the school of American artists who believe the mass
production of commodities and media images has caused a deteriora-
tion in the quality of society, and this artistic tradition of which he
is a member proposes through incorporating these images into
works of art to comment critically both on the incorporated object
and the political and economic system that created it.6
However, the court refused to take into account defendant's
artistic style in its fair use analysis.57 It stated that the con-
sideration of artistic style would make the boundary of the fair
use defense intractable.58  Likewise, the court rejected
defendant's claim that his appropriation was similar to that of
a parodist's because both intended to use appropriation to
engage in social criticism, and stated that: "It is not really the
parody flag that [defendant is] sailing under, but rather the
flag of piracy."59
Interestingly, some commentators suggest that the court
was wrong in finding substantial similarity in the two works,
for viewers of each work would perceive it very differently:
"[Defendant] depicts a couple with clown faces painted in gar-
ish colors with daisies in their hair. They are embracing eight
gigantic blue puppies sporting bulbous noses.... Gone is the
"Id.
54 Id.
Even before Rogers, the courts found that a statue of a two-dimensional
copyrighted work infringed the copyright of the work used. See, e.g., Flelscher
Studios, Inc. v. Ralph A. Freundlich, Inc., 73 F.2d 276 (2d Cir. 1934) (holding that
the two-dimensional copyrighted cartoon of the character called "Betty Boop" was
infringed by a three-dimensional form of doll that reproduced the essential charac-
teristics of the copyrighted character).
56 Rogers, 960 F.2d at 309.
5 As to the four fair use factors in § 107, the Second Circuit found that (1)
defendant's use was for a primarily commercial purpose; (2) defendant copied the
creative, imaginative.work by plaintiff; (3) defendant copied "the essence of photo-
graph"; and (4) the commercial nature of defendant's work gave rise to a presump-
tion of economic harms to plaintiffs photograph. Id. at 310-12.
" Id. at 310.
59 Id. at 311.
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"charming" and cuddly warmth of [plaintiffs] photograph, and
in its place is a garish, perhaps horrifying, perhaps hilarious
image." 60
Following this case, Koons lost two additional copyright
infringement cases also involving a sculpture based on a copy-
righted image.6'
2. Digital Sampling Cases
6 2
The digital sampling cases indicate that the courts have
little tolerance toward this widely used technique for music
composition." For example, a district court judge found that a
rap artist who digitally sampled a portion of an old pop song,
"Alone Again (Naturally)," was liable for copyright infringe-
ment, although the appropriated portion consisted a short
keyboard riff in the introduction of the original song and the
two songs were utterly unlike each other and reached com-
pletely different markets." The judge opened his opinion by
stating that: " 'Thou shalt not steal' has been an admonition
"Lynne A. Greenberg, The Art of Appropriation: Puppies, Piracy, and Post-
Modernism, 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 26-27 (1992). See also Marlin H.
Smith, Note, The Limits of Copyright. Property, Parody, and the Public Domain, 42
DUKE L.J. 1233, 1251 (1993) ("Puppies is a realistic portrait of a proud couple and
their pets. String of Puppies, in contrast, is a garishly painted sculpture featuring
clown-nosed, blue dogs, and an insipid, smiling couple with flowers in their hair!).
6 Campbell v. Koons, No. 91 Civ. 6055, 1993 WL 97381 (S.D.N.Y. April 1,
1993) (plaintiffs copyright in photograph Boys with Pig" infringed by sculpture);
United Feature Syndicate, Inc. v. Koons, 817 F. Supp. 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (sculp-
ture infringed plaintiffs copyright in comic strip character Odis).
In digital sampling, artists reuse, manipulate or combine digitized form of
recorded sound using a digital data processing machine such as a computerized
synthesizer. Rap musicians have made extensive use of digital sampling in the
composition of their songs. David Sanjek, Don't Have to DJ No More": Sampling
and the 'Autonomous' Creator, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 607 (1992). The form
of digital sampling practiced by rap artists usually appropriates a minimal amount
of well-known melody, which has the effect of catching listeners' attention to their
songs. Id. at 612-13.
Judges are not alone in showing distaste or little tolerance toward the prac-
tices of digital sampling. One popular music critic wrote: 'it sometimes seems
that sophisticated copying has overtaken innovation, that an exhausted culture can
only trot out endless retreads." Jon Pareles, In Pop, Whose Song Is It, Anyway?,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1989, B1.
" Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Brothers Records, Inc., 780 F. Supp.
182 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
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followed since the dawn of civilization."65 In his view, digital
sampling was nothing more than "stealing," although it was
often accompanied by significant creative addition and has
been used widely by music composers.66
In two other digital sampling cases, judges refused to
grant summary judgment on copyright infringement issue in
favor of defendant. 7 They both rejected defendant's claim that
what was taken was uncopyrightable and that, even if copy-
rightable, there was no substantial similarity. While both judg-
es said little on artistic contributions made by defendant, they
seemed to go out of their way to find originality in what little
was appropriated.
C. The Fair Use Doctrine
The fair use doctrine enables courts to curb the monopoly
given to a copyright owner in order to serve greater public
interest.68 The Supreme Court has explained fair use as a doc-
trine that "permits the courts to avoid rigid application of the
copyright statute when on occasion, it would stifle that very
creativity which the law is designed to foster."69 Section 107
of the 1976 Act gives a nonexclusive list of possible fair uses,
including uses for the purpose of criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research."
Id. at 183 (footnote omitted).
The judge also accepted the fact that digital sampling was a widely used
technique for music composition. Id at 185.
Jarvis v. A&M Records, 827 F. Supp. 282 (D.N.J. 1993) (in a partial denial
of defendant's motion for summary judgment, the court found that sound and
phrases "ohhs," "moves" and "free your body," i.e. what was appropriated by defen-
dant, are expressions with a distinctive melody/rhythm that is capable of being in-
fringed); Tin Pan Apple Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 30 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1791
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 1994) (declining to hold, as matter of law, that defendant's
digital sampling of works, 'hugga hugga" and "brrr," from plaintiffs song constitut-
ed non-infringing copying of non-copyrightable material).
6HOARCE G. BALL, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 260
(1944) (fair use is "a privilege in others than the owner of a copyright to use the
copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without his consent, notwithstanding
the monopoly granted to the owner").
" Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990) (quoting Iowa State Univ. Re-
search Found. v. American Broad. Cos., 621 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1980)).
70 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
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In determining whether the use made of a work in any
particular case is a fair use, the courts are to consider the fol-
lowing four factors: 1
1. the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purpos-
es;
2. the nature of the copyrighted work;
3. the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to
the copyrighted work as a whole; and
4. the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work.
Although the legislative history of the Act clearly indicates
that these statutory factors are not exclusive, 2 most courts
structure their analysis of fair use claims around the evalu-
ation of each of the four factors. 3
The fact specific nature of the fair use doctrine makes it
both difficult and unwise to predict its applicability to appro-
priative works in general. 4 Yet, a brief look at these four fac-
tors suggests that many appropriative works would have a
difficult time meeting the fair use standard, because of the
following reasons: First, the purpose of the use is often com-
mercial; second, appropriative works generally do not fall with-
in a category of works for which the courts have traditionally
granted fair use (the Second Circuit refused to consider artistic
tradition to which an accused infringer adheres); third, ap-
propriative works often take a substantial portion of the origi-
nal and/or a portion of the original that is considered most
valuable; and fourth, many appropriative works appeal to a
different audience, and thus have little effect on the market of
the original. Furthermore, appropriative works, by increasing
the exposure of the original, may actually enhance the market
71 Id.
72See HL.R REP. No. 94-1476, at 66 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.CA.N.
5659, 5679.
See, e.g., Stewart, 495 U.S. at 237-38.
' See, eg., Lloyd L. Weiareb, Fair's Fair: A Comment on the Fair Mse Doc-
trine, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1137, 1138 (1990) ("[Flair use has historically been and
ought to remain ... an exemption from copyright infringement for uses that are
fair. What is fair is ... fact-specific and resistant to generalization...
"' Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 310 (2d Cir. 1992).
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value of the original. However, the Second Circuit in Rogers
presumed a negative economic effect based on the commercial
nature of defendant's appropriative work. 6
1. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc."
When a work is categorized as parody, courts are generally
more willing to excuse appropriation as a fair use.7" For ex-
ample, in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., the Supreme
Court categorized 2 Live Crew's rap version of "Oh, Pretty
Woman""9 as parody and allowed the fair use defense," al-
though the use was commercial and the appropriated expres-
sions were copyright protected expressions that touched the
heart of the original.8 ' This permissive attitude toward appro-
priation by a parodist arguably flows from the recognition of
parody as a valuable art form 2 and of likely unwillingness of
copyright owners to license their work for the use in parody.'
"' Id. Cf Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994) (finding little
economic effect on the original for a parody despite its commercial nature).
7 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
7 See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
7' "Oh, Pretty Woman" is a rock ballad composed by Roy Orbison and William
Dees in 1964. Campell, 510 U.S. at 572. Acuff-Rose, a copyright owner of the song
declined to license the song to 2 Live Crew despite the request by 2 Live Crew's
manager. Id.
80 Compared to digital sampling cases discussed above, Justice Souter seemed
to give more recognition to the artistic or social value of rap music. For example,
he defined a rap music as follows: "style of black American popular music consist-
ing of improvised rhymes performed to a rhythmic accompaniment." Id. at 672 n.1
(quoting THE NORTON/GROVE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MUSIC 613 (1988)).
8' Id. at 583-89. As for the effect of the appropriative use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work, the Court stated that a parody was
less likely to affect that market for the original because a parody was unlikely to
act as substitute for the original. Id. at 591.
' See, e.g., Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 545 (2d Cir. 1964)
("[Als a general proposition, we believe that parody and satire are deserving of
substantial freedom-both as entertainment and as a form of social and literary
criticism.").
' See also Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 440 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding that
"When Sonny Sniffs Glue," a parody of 'When Sunny Gets Blue," is fair use). See
generally Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use As Market Failure: A Structual and Econom-
ic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUb. L. REV. 1600,
1633 (1982) [hereinafter Gordon, Fair Use] (because a parody, by definition, ridi-
cules, scorns and generally makes fun of the work for which a license is being
sought, a license is unlikely to be granted, creating a market failure which makes
a broad application of the fair use appropriate).
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Consequently, appropriation by a parodist is likely to be ex-
cused as a fair use, as long as the parodist takes no more than
necessary to make the parody, that is, what is necessary to
conjure up at least enough of the original.'
Justice Souter states that "[tihe threshold question when
fair use is raised in defense of parody is whether a parodic
character may reasonably be perceived," regardless of whether
a parody is in good taste or bad.' For a work to be judged to
possess "a parodic character," several factors are considered.'
The most important factor is whether a work is "reasonably
perceived as commenting on the original or criticizing it, to
some degree.""7 Additional factors include whether the parodic
element is slight or great, and whether the copying is small or
extensive in relation to the parodic element.' It is not re-
quired that an artist label her work as parody."
Most appropriative works are unlikely to fall within the
parody category. First, many appropriative works do not appro-
priate in order to directly criticize the original.' In fact, it is
"Campbell, 510 U.S. at 588. Cf Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broad. Co.,
623 F.2d 252, 253 n.1 (2d Cir. 1980) ("Even more extensive use [than that neces-
sary to 'conjure up' the original] would still be fair use, provided that parody
builds upon the original.., contributing something new for humorous effect or
commentary.')
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 582.
Whether a work can be considered a parody is judged on case by case basis.
Id. at 581 ("[P]arody, like any other use, has to work its way through the relevant
factors, and to be judged case by case, in light of the ends of the copyright law").
In finding 2 Live Crew's song as a parody of Roy Orbison's "Oh, Pretty Woman,"
Justice Souter assessed 2 Live Crew's work as follows:
2-Live Crew juxtaposes the romantic musings of a man whose fantasy
comes true, with degrading taunts, a bawdy demand for sex, and sigh of
relief from paternal responsibility. The later words can be taken as a
comment on the naivete of the original of an earlier day, as a rejection
of its sentiment that ignores the ugliness of street life and the debase-
ment that it signifies.
Id at 583.
v Id. Justice Souter elaborated upon the Court's analysis of this factor.
If... the commentary has no critical bearing on the substance or style
of the original composition, which the alleged infringer merely uses to get
attention or to avoid the drudgery in working up something fresh, the
claim to fairness in borrowing from another's work diminishes accordingly
(if it does not vanish), and other factors, like the extent of its
commerciality, loom larger.
Id- at 580.
Id. at 580 n.14.
Id. at 583 n.17.
For example, Koons appropriated another's copyrighted work in order to
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not uncommon for an artist to take from many different sourc-
es to create a work,91 thus making it even harder to satisfy
this factor. To the extent an appropriative work fails to directly
criticize the original, Justice Souter warns that "[the] claim to
fairness in borrowing from another's work diminishes accord-
ingly."9 2 Second, a parody is often meant to be funny, while
most appropriative works, like most creative works, are not.
Third, appropriative artists often allocate lesser-known
works," but courts are more inclined to accept a parody de-
fense when an appropriated work is well known.94 Once an
appropriative work falls outside the parody category, the four
statutory factors weigh against a finding of fair use, especially
if the work takes from the essence of the original with little
transformation for a commercial purpose.95
2. Twin Peaks Productions, Inc. v. Publications Int'l,
Ltd.96
Web pages that comment on popular movies or television
shows proliferate over the Internet. 7 Although these pages
are generally run for a noncommercial purpose by an individu-
al, the Second Circuit decision in Twin Peaks suggests that the
use of copyrighted works in these Web pages may not be ex-
cused as a fair use.
criticize society as a whole. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 309 (2d Cir. 1992).
"' It is not uncommon for a single music piece to combine digital samples from
as many as 100 sources. Rick Vanderknyff, Positively Outspoken Negativeland; Pop
Music: The Band Takes To Bogart's The Kind Of Electronic Message of Artistic
Freedom That Got It Into Legal Trouble With U2, LA. TIMES, May 8, 1993, at Fl.
'2 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580.
For example, Koons used Rogers's little known "Puppies" because it por-
trayed a typical American scene. Rogers, 960 F.2d at 305.
"' Compare Elsmere Music Inc. v. National Broad. Co., 482 F. Supp. 741
(S.D.N.Y.) (finding parody of "I Love New York" fair use) with Rogers v. Koons,
960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 934 (1992) (Koons chose
Rogers's "Puppies" because the image portrayed was "typical commonplace and
familiar"). Rogers, 960 F.2d at 305.
" See supra notes 68-76 and accompanying text.
" 996 F.2d 1366 (2d Cir. 1993).
For a discussion on Web publishing by individuals, see supra note 5. See
also infra notes 231-40 and accompanying text.
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The Second Circuit found that a book about plaintiff's
popular television program "Twin Peaks" infringed the
plaintiffs copyright, rejecting defendant's fair use defense.
Defendant published a book entitled Welcome to Twin Peaks: A
Complete Guide to Who's Who and What's What based on the
first eight episodes of plaintiffs very successful television pro-
gram. Defendant's book consisted of seven chapters, dealing
with, respectively: (1) the popularity of the show; (2) the char-
acters and the actors who play them; (3) the plots of the eight
episodes, some commentary on the plots, and "unanswered
questions"; (4) David Lynch, the creator of the show; (5) Mark
Frost, the producer of the show, and Snoqualmie, Washington,
the location of the show; (6) the music of the show; and (7)
trivia questions and quotations constituting the "Wit and wis-
dom of Agent Cooper," one of the characters."
Defendant claimed fair use, stating that the book is a work
of comment, criticism, or news reporting.9 The Second Circuit
upheld the lower court's rejection of the fair use defense be-
cause: (1) defendant's detailed report of the plots went far
beyond merely identifying their basic outline for the
transformative purposes of comment or criticism; (2) what was
taken was a work of fiction and the magnitude of public reac-
tion to the televised program did not make the entire content
of the teleplays a fact that could be reported and analyzed; (3)
defendant lifted a substantial portion of plaintiffs work; and
finally (4) even if defendant was correct in arguing that its
work provided helpful publicity and thereby tended to confer
an economic benefit on the copyright holder, the defendant's
book competed in markets in which plaintiff had a legitimate
interest."0
D. Conclusion
There are several conclusions that one can reasonably
make from the precedents dealing with appropriative arts.
First, courts have not hesitated to find infringement, even
when appropriation results in what is arguably a new
" Twin Peaks, 996 F.2d at 1370.
9Id. at 1374.
'0 Id at 1375-78.
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transformative work. Second, it is no defense to claim that one
practices a style of art that, by its definition, requires appropri-
ation. Third, courts are less appreciative of the amount of labor
and creativity exhibited by an appropriator, while they willing-
ly find creativity and expression in what was appropriated.
Fourth, even a small amount of appropriation can be consid-
ered an infringement. Fifth, the fair use defense is likely to
fail, unless a court categorizes defendant's work as parody.
In summary, the current copyright system discourages
artistic activities that are more appropriative in favor of those
that are less so, 1' and thus forces courts to play the role of
an art critic despite Justice Holmes' warning that:
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the
law to constitute themselves the final judges of the worth of pictorial
illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits. At
the one extreme, some works of genius would be sure to miss appre-
ciation. Their very novelty would make them repulsive until the
public had learned the new language in which their author spoke. It
may be more than doubted, for instance, whether the etchings of
Goya or the paintings of Manet would have been sure of protection
when seen for the first time. At the other end, copyright would be
denied to pictures which appealed to a public less educated than the
judge. Yet if they command the interest of any public, they have a
commercial value,-it would be bold to say they have not an aes-
thetic and educational value,-and the taste of any public is not to
be treated with contempt. It is an ultimate fact for the moment,
whatever may be our hopes for a change. That these pictures had
their worth and their success is sufficiently shown by the desire to
reproduce them without regard to plaintiffs' rights."°
One of the main causes underlying the conflict between
the copyright system and appropriative art is section 106(2) of
the 1976 Act, which is construed to grant broad derivative
rights to a copyright owner. The next section briefly traces the
history of derivative rights.
101 It is important to keep in mind that all creative activities include some
appropriative elements and thus potentially face copyright infringement challenge
as derivative work. See supra notes 6-19 and accompanying text.
102 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1903).
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II. THE EXPANSION OF DERIVATIVE RIGHTS: HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE
A. Early Copyright Law: Prior to the Mid-Nineteenth Century
Early United States copyright law protected a copyright
owner against the production of substantially similar copies in
the same medium as one's work.. 3 For example, the exclu-
sive rights granted by the first federal copyright act were limit-
ed to the right to print, reprint, publish, or vend maps, charts,
and books."' Thus, one was free to translate the text of a
copyrighted book, °5 make perforated rolls for use in a me-
chanical piano player to reproduce the sound of a copyrighted
musical composition,106 or make an abridgment. ' ° For in-
stance, in Stowe v. Thomas, the court held that defendant, who
made a German translation of plaintiffs novel, Uncle Tom's
Cabin, did not infringe plaintiffs copyright in the original. In
so holding, the court construed the scope of copyright protec-
tion narrowly, limiting it to "the expression of the thoughts;
that is to the language in which they are conveyed."' The
10 For history of Anglo-American copyright system, see BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN
UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 9-37 (1967) ("In modem copyright terms, early
copyright jurisprudence recognized the right of reproduction, but not the right to
make derivative works, that is, the right to control other form[s] in which a work
may recast, transformed, or adopted"); LAYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HIS-
TORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1968).
Act of May 31, 1790, c. 15 a. 1, 1 Stat. 124, 1st Cong., 2d Sess.
10 Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853) (No. 13,514) (holding
that a German translation of Uncle Tom's Cabin did not infringe copyright in the
original, which was written in English).
10 White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
107 Story v. Holcombe, 23 F. Cas. 171 (C.C.D. Ohio, 1847) (No. 13,497) (A fair
abridgment of any book is considered a new work, as to write it requires labor
and exercise of judgment"). To be considered fair abridgment, and not a piracy of
a copyrighted work, [t]here must be real substantial condensation of the materi-
als, and intellectual labor and judgment bestowed there on, and not merely the
facile use of the scissors, or extracts of the essential parts, constituting the chief
value of the original work." Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841)
(No. 4,901) (Story, J.).
10" Stowe, 23 F. Cas. at 205. As a result, the court gave little consideration to
the fact that plaintiff used her own resources to have the novel translated in
German by another scholar and that the defendants work harmed the sale of the
plaintiffs German version. It stated that "[tlhe sale of her translation, indeed, was
impaired; but we are not charged with a piracy of it: and the reason why it is
injured, is that her translation has less genius than ours." Il. at 206.
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court stated that a translation was not "a servile and mechani-
cal imitation," and instead required originality and talent."'
It also found that a translation enhanced the value of the origi-
nal."10
In summary, early copyright decisions valued the expense,
skill, labor, or money that a second comer devoted in creating a
new work. Courts inquired into the nature of second author-
ship and the values that a new work conferred to the society.
In Justice Story's words: "He... , who by his own skill, judg-
ment and labor, writes a new work, and does not merely copy
that of another, is entitled to a copy-right therein; if the varia-
tions are not merely formal and shadowy, from existing
works.'
B. The Gradual Expansion of Derivative Rights
Congress gradually expanded the scope of these exclusive
rights."' The 1802 revision to copyright law declared it to be
infringement if another person, without authorization, caused
a work to be "engraved, etched, copied or sold, in the whole or
in the part, by varying, adding to, or diminishing from the
main design.""' The 1856 revision granted dramatic composi-
tion a right of pubic performance.'14 In 1870, Congress passed
the first copyright statute"' that granted derivative
rights"6 by providing that "authors may reserve the right to
10 Id. at 205. The court concluded that "[a] translation . . . depends entirely for
its success upon its individuality, and for that reason, is original with the
translator." Id.
"0 Id. at 206.
.. Emerson v. Davies, 8 Fed. Cas. 615, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4,436)
(finding that defendant's work that copied the same plan, arrangement, gradation
of examples and illustrations by unit marks, in the same page, in imitation of the
plaintiff's book, infringed plaintiffs copyright despite some differences, which the
court discounted has merely colorable in devices to disguise the copy).
1 KAPLAN, supra note 103, at 25-37.
13 Act of April 29, 1802, ch. 35, 7th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 Stat. 171.
14 Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, 34th Cong., 1st Sess., 11 Stat 138.
115 Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230 § 86, 41st Cong., 2d Sess., 16 Stat. 198.
" Goldstein, supra note 25, at 214.
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dramatize or to translate their own works.""' The 1909
Act"8 further expanded derivative rights by including the
right to:
translate the copyrighted work into other language or dialects, or
make any other version thereof, ifit be a literary work to dramatize
it if it be a nondramatic work; to convert it into a novel or other
nondramatic work ifit be a drama; to arrange or adapt it ifit be a
musical work; to complete, execute, and finish it if it be a model or
design for a work of art."'
The legislative history of the 1909 Act contains little explana-
tion for the expansion of derivative rights,' ' except that it
merely codified the existing law as construed by the courts.'"'
Similarly, courts expanded the scope of copyright by focus-
ing on the protection of commercial values of the original. For
example, in Daly v. Palmer,' which Professor Goldstein con-
siders to be the first case that effectively granted derivative
rights,' infringement was found based on similarities in
"the action, the narrative, the dramatic effect and the impres-
sions, and the series of events in the [parties'] two scenes,1 4
although the two scenes differed in details and although these
scenes comprised only a small portion of the parties' plays."M
The court emphasized that the allegedly copied scene was the
most commercially valuable part of the plaintiffs play and that
similarities between the two scenes comprised those elements
1,7 Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230 § 86, 41st Cong., 2d Sess., 16 Stat. 198.
11 Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, 60th Cong., 2d Sess., 35 Stat. 1075.
1 Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320 § 1(b), 60th Cong., 2d Ses., 35 Stat. 1075.
See 2 PATRY, supra note 24, at 821 (The legislative reports discussion of
Section 1() is laconic. . . ).
' "Paragraph (b) in the section contains certain new legislative features, but is
consistent with the existing law as construed by the court." ILR. REP. NO. 60-
2222, at 4 (1909); S. REP. No. 60-1108, at 4 (1909).
Daly v. Palmer, 6 F. Cas. 1132 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1868) (No. 3,552).
Professor Goldstein states that the Daly case marks "the first great intel-
lectual leap, auguring copyright's break from the confines of 'copies,' and the even-
tual statutory expansion of derivative rights. Goldstein, supra note 25, at 213.
' Defendant allegedly took plaintiff's "railroad scene" in which one character,
tied to a railroad track, is saved by another from an onrushing train. The court
accepted that the "railroad scene" was the chief value of the plaintiff's play and
its popularity depended upon it. Daly, 6 F. Cas. at 1135-36. Defendant's scene
differed in terms of characters, dialogues, and a manner of rescue from that of
plaintiff's. Id.
1' Id. at 1136.
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that most appealed to paying audiences. 126 As a result, the
court concluded that defendant's work functioned as a substi-
tute for plaintiffs play and thus harmed plaintiff's market."'
The Second Circuit, in Dam v. Kirk La Shelle Co., found
that a play that used the same theme as a copyrighted story
infringed upon the right to dramatize the copyrighted sto-
ry.128 The court accepted that the copyrighted story was used
as merely a framework and that there were significant differ-
ences between the two works. 129 Despite such significant dif-
ferences, the court found similarities in many unimportant de-
tails, which it concluded could not be considered coincidences.
In the end, the court justified the finding of infringement not-
withstanding significant creative contributions by defendant,
because "[it is impossible to make a play out of a story-to
represent a narrative by dialogue and action-without making
changes, and a playwright who appropriates the theme of
another's story cannot, in our opinion, escape the charge of
infringement by adding to or slightly varying his incident."'
In 1911, the Supreme Court relied on Dam to affirm a
Second Circuit decision that defendant's motion picture, Ben
Hur, infringed plaintiff's rights in the novel of the same
name.'3' Like in Dam, the fact that defendant made signifi-
cant changes in making the motion picture did not help defen-
dant in the suit.
These cases support Professor Jane Ginsburg's observation
that "the appeal of the 'new toil' defense to copyright infringe-
ment appears to have diminished by the end of the nineteenth
120 Id. at 1138.
' Id. at 1136-37. The court used the economic effect on the original to
distinguish this case from abridgement cases, stating that abridgement did not
compete with the original. Id. (quoting D'Almaine v. Boosey, 1 Younge & C. 288).
Lord Chief Baron Lyndhurst stated that "the purpose of abridgment was distinct
from that of the work from which it was taken," and appealed to a different audi-
ence, i.e., practitioners rather than student. Id. at 1136.
1 175 F. 902 (2d Cir. 1910) (holding that defendant's play infringed plaintiffs
right to dramatize his story, even though the play borrowed only the story's cen-
tral incident and contributed events, characters and dialogue of its own).
12 Id. at 907. The court stated that "[fit is . . . true that the play has more
characters than the story and many additional incidents. It is likewise true that
none of the language of the story is used in the play, and that the characters
have different names.- Id.
130 Id.
131 Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55 (1911).
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century.... [A] second corner's toil in creating a derivative
version of a high authorship work, such as a translation or a
dramatization, no longer secured exemption from liability."' 2
Instead of examining the extent of a "new toil" by a second
comer, the courts began focusing on protecting the copyright
owner's commercial interests in the original, which led to the
expansive interpretation of the scope of copyright protection.
C. The 1976 Act and Beyond
In the 1976 Act, Congress gave a copyright owner not only
the exclusive right to reproduce one's work in copies, but also
the exclusive right to "prepare derivative works based upon the
copyrighted work,"" and broadly defined a "derivative
work.""5 The fair use doctrine became the only major limi-
tation to a copyright owner's expansive derivative rights."
There is little legislative history on derivative rightsY
One commentator attributes such "skimpy legislative history"
regarding section 106(2) to the fact that its formulation of
derivative rights appeared in the very first revision bill intro-
duced in 1964.' Professor Pamela Samuelson concludes that
Congress was "merely restating preexisting law in a more
simple and concise way," like it did in 1909.'"s
The copyright industries continue to press for the further
expansion of their monopoly power and policy makers have
been susceptible to their demands. 9 They use the threat im-
2 Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of
Works of Information, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1865, 1890 (1990).
" 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994).
124 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). See also supra note 26 and accompanying text.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
PATRY, supra note 24, at 821.
"' PATRY, supra note 24, at 821. See also S. 88-3008, H.R. 11947 at 5(a)(2)
(1964).
' Pamela Samuelson, Allocating Ownership Rights in Computer-Generated
Works, 47 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1185, 1214 (1986).
1 A proposal to extend copyright term to life plus seventy years is currently
pending in the 105th Congress. H.R. 105-604, (1997). See also Intellectual Property
and the National Information Infrastructure: The Report of the Working Group on
the Intellectual Property Rights, (Nov. 15, 1995)
<http/www.uspt.govAveb/officesfcom/doc/ipnii/> [hereinafter NII White Paper] (ex-
panding copyright owner's right in the digital environment, for example by propos-
ing modification of the first-sale doctrine so that copyright owners maintain control
of works that are transmitted electronically). Many copyright owners argue that
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posed by the new digital technology to push for the stronger
copyright protection.14 The widely publicized 1995 report on
intellectual property rights succinctly summarizes a copyright
industries' main concern:
The establishment of high-speed, high-capacity information systems
makes it possible for one individual, with a few key strokes, to deliv-
er perfect copies of digitized works to scores of others-or to upload
a copy on a bulletin board or other service where thousands can
download it or print unlimited "hard" copies. Just one authorized
uploading could have devastating effects on the market for the
work.
1 41
However, it is important to note that threats of the new digital
media has not materialized yet. For example, the sale of books,
which is supposedly most threaten by the new digital technolo-
gy; grew by four percent in 1996.142 Professor Layman Ray
Patterson, in his analysis of the Anglo-American system, found
that the copyright system had been assuming that strong copy-
right protection would lead to the production of more works,
which would ultimately serve users' interests. In current
even the NII White Paper did not go far enough in terms of protecting interests
of copyright owners. See <http//venable.com/oracle/guide.htm> (Mar. 20, 1997)
(summarizing industry groups' opinions on the NII White Paper that appeared in
Information Law Alert). In fact, many industry groups have pushed toward making
"browsing" the Web a copyright infringement unless a user pays royalty. Id. The
Association of American Publishers, the Information Industry Association, and the
National Association of Broadcasters take the position that "any use" of copyright-
ed materials on the Web should not be considered fair use. Id.
"4 For example, The Association of American Publishers, which is the principal
trade association of the book publishing industry, considers the "safeguarding and
strengthening the system of intellectual property rights" in the new digital media
as its top priority. <http'/www.publishers.org> (Mar. 20, 1997). See generally Brian
Kahin, The Strategic Environment for Protecting Multimedia, in 1 IMA INTELLEC-
TUAL PROPERTY PROJECT PROCEEDINGS (Brian Kahin ed., 1994) ("Owners of rights
to music, images, and other forms of content view the emerging network environ-
ment as the latest evolutionary stage to threaten the stability and security of the
distribution chain.") [hereinafter I IMA PROCEEDING].
141 See NI White Paper, supra note 139.
142 <http'/www.publishers.org/news/releases/sales.html> (Mar. 20, 1997) (reporting
that U.S. book sales exceeded $20 billion in 1996, which is a 4 percent increase
over 1995). See also Jim Milliot, New Study Puts Global Book Market at $80 Bil-
lion-Euromonitor Report Indicates Worldwide Book Sales Reached $80.1 Billion in
1995, Representing 8% Increase, PUBLISHERS WKLY, Oct. 14, 1996, at 10; Kim
Campbell, US Consumers Say "Yes" to Books, CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR, Sep. 5,
1995, at 9. The multimedia industry, on the other hand, lost money in 1996.
James Flint, Connected: Survival of the Fittest Analysis-The Milia 97 Multimedia
Conference Was a Lesson in Home Truths, Daily Telegraph, Feb. 18, 1997, at 12.
" According to Professor Patterson, similar arguments have been used to ex-
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debates over the new digital media,1" Bruce Lehman, Com-
missioner of Patents and Trademarks, used a similar argu-
ment to support further restrictions on users' rights:
[The proposed measure, which protects] people against the theft of
their intellectual property, [is] not trying to stop fair use. If you are
going to have people making large-scale investments in this new
digital environment, they have to have some sense of security that
they are going to be protected and make money on it."
Is it true that strong copyright protection, in particular broad
derivative rights, ultimately serves the interests of individual
users? The following section examines various policies used to
justify derivative rights.
IIl. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR DERIVATIVE RIGIs 14 6
pand copyright protection since the beginning of the Anglo-American copyright
system in the seventeenth century. PATTERSON, supra note 103, at 227-28. Profes-
sor Patterson calls the rights of the individual user "the forgotten ideas of copy-
right." PATTERSON, supra note 103, at 227-28. See also Wendy J. Gordon, On Own-
ing Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutional Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV.
146, 156-57 (1992) (citing perception that greater intellectual property protection
would enhance national prosperity as a central factor in fueling the increase in
the scope of copyright protection over the last two decades).
14 See supra notes 139-41 and accompanying text.
143 Carol Levin & Don WTllmott, Is it Mine Online? International Panel Irons
out Internet Policy, PC MAGAZINE, Feb. 4, 1997, at 30.
I" There are many articles that examine justifications for derivative rights:
Ginsburg, supra note 132, at 1871, 1881-88 (explaining derivative rights based on
personality theory); Goldstein, supra note 25 (stating that courts' eagerness to pro-
tect economic interests of copyright owners drove the expansion of derivative
rights); Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MIC. L.
REv. 1197 (1996) (attributing expansive copyright protection to interest-group poli-
tics and self-justification of the lawmaker class, which includes legislators, judges,
lawyers, opinion makers, and persons with wealth and political influence); Wendy
J. Gordon, A Property in Self Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natu-
ral Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533 (1993); L. Ray Patterson, Free
Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1987); Neil Weinstock
Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE LJ. 283 (1996);
James Boyle, A Theory of Law and Information: Copyright, Spleens, Blac.mail,
and Insider Trading, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 1413 (1992) [hereinafter Theory of Law
and Information]; PATTERSON, supra note 103 (stating that the natural right of the
author was a major factor); KAPLAN, supra note 103. For analysis of derivative
rights based on economic analysis, see William. M Landes & Richard A. Posner,
An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STuD. 325, 353-57 (1989);
Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright, 84 HARv. L. REV. 281 (1970);
Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright's Incentives.Access Paradigm, 49
VAND. L. REV. 483, 628-653 (1996).
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A. The Economic Theory
The economic theory is often used to justify the current
copyright system.' Expressive works are considered differ-
ent from tangible products, because they can be reproduced at
a much lower cost than the cost of creating them. Without
copyright protection, the price of an expressive work would
quickly fall to a marginal cost, which would be too low to allow
its author to recover the high initial cost of creation. Copyright
law, by prohibiting copying of expressive works, not only pre-
vents this harmful copying, but also enables owners to charge
monopoly prices. As a result, it encourages the production of
expressive works. For copyright law to be economically effi-
cient, it must balance the benefits from creating additional
works against losses from limiting access to the work and the
costs of administering it.
Some commentators argue that derivative rights allow the
copyright system to further economic efficiency."' Three ar-
guments are typically given in support of derivative rights.
First, by granting profits from derivative markets to a copy-
right owner, derivative rights increase the incentive to engage
in creative activities. Second, derivative rights encourage earli-
er publication of an original work by making it unnecessary to
withhold the publication in order to gain a lead time in deriva-
tive markets. Third, derivative rights reduce transactional
costs by concentrating the control over derivative works on the
copyright owner.'49
147 See generally Landes & Posner, supra note 146, at 448-66.
'" Landes & Posner, supra note 146, at 353-57.
..9 For a critical evaluation of economic efficiency argument for derivative
rights, see Sterk, supra note 146, at 1216-20 (arguing that economic justifications
provided by Landes & Posner are unpersuasive); Lunney, supra note 146, at 628-
56 (concluding that "to ensure a consonance between price and marginal social
value that will lead individuals to devote their talents and resources to the high-
est-valued use," copyright should prohibit only exact or near-exact duplication and
certain non-transformative derivative uses of a copyrighted work).
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1. The Incentive Factor
Professor William Landes and Judge Richard Posner argue
that derivative rights increase the level of investment in ex-
pressive works by enabling its owner to earn returns from all
markets, not just the market in which the work first ap-
pears.50 As applied to the movie industry, this argument
seems plausible. Arguably, the rising cost of an average movie
makes the industry more reliant on revenues from derivative
works.'5' In fact, the movie industry is increasingly turning
to copyright licensing to increase its revenues. 2 It is not un-
common for the total earnings from derivative works to exceed
movie ticket sales,' and companies, like the Walt Disney
Company ("Disney"), have successfully exploited derivative
rights to generate considerable profits."
Professor Stewart Sterk argues that derivative rights can
be justified only when the projected returns from the original
work are too small to justify the cost of production, and when
the projected returns from the derivative work are so large
relative to the cost of producing the derivative work that the
difference would more than make up the projected deficit on
the original work alone.'55 According to his argument, deriv-
ative rights for many successful works would be unnecessary,
for returns from the original work alone would cover the cost of
production. For example, Patricia Cornwell, who earns eight
' Landes & Posner, supra note 146, at 354.
The cost of an average Hollywood movie has increased by 14856 during the
last decade, reaching $60 million in 1996. Bernard Weinraub, Average Holywood
Film Now Costs $60 Million, N.Y. TInIES, Mar. 5, 1997, at C18.
1" See supra note 1; see also Goldstein, supra note 25, at 209 (stating that for
many popular motion pictures, the income from sales of derivative merchandises,
such as dolls, sheets, posters, etc., often exceed income from movie ticket sales).
153 Goldstein, supra note 25, at 209.
154 As early as the 1930s, the Walt Disney Company foresaw the substantial
economic gains from licensing the images of its animated motion picture characters
in a variety of consumer media, from publication, to soft toys, clothing and house-
hold items. INTERNATIONAL BUREAU, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORG., Charac-
ter Merchandising, WIJINFI93 (1993). 'Toy Story' is expected to generate total
profits from the box office, videos, computer games and merchandising of nearly
$400 million. Steve Lohr, Animation: Hollywood's Gold Rush, Pixars 'Toy Story'
Provides Profit Motive, INTrL HERALD TRIB., Feb. 25, 1997, at 1L
"' Sterk, supra note 146, at 1215-16.
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million dollars per Scarpetta mystery,56 obviously does not
need income from a movie or television-drama licensing to
cover her original cost of production.
However, the use of the initial production cost as a yard
stick to determine the appropriate size of incentive seems rath-
er arbitrary, if not wrong. Would Ms. Cornwell write another
Scarpetta mystery without additional income from derivative
works? Ms. Cornwell may view the extra money that derivative
works bring a necessary incentive to force herself to labor
instead of living leisurely on huge royalties that her earlier
works generate. Similarly, Disney might not have produced as
many animation films, had it not been for the enormous re-
turns from derivative works.
157
Yet broad derivative rights have at least four negative
economic effects, posing serious doubt over the argument that
broad derivative rights increase allocative efficiency. First, it is
not clear whether derivative rights are necessary for a copy-
right owner to earn income from derivative markets. A copy-
right owner has an advantage of a lead time in derivative mar-
kets, for she can simultaneously prepare derivative works as
she produces the original. For many works, a derivative work
prepared by another does not function as a substitute for a
similar work prepared by the original author. Moreover, unfair
competition law protects a copyright owner against those who
free ride on her reputation.158 For example, Ms. Cornwell pre-
... In 1996, Patricia Cornwell signed a contract worth $24 million for her three
future Dr. Kay Scarpetta mysteries. Deidre Donahue, Cornwell's $8 Million Myster-
ies, USA TODAY, Mar. 6, 1996, at D1. She earned $6,000 for her first Scarpetta
mystery in 1990. Id. Daniel Steel, Tom Clancy and John Grisham are believed to
earn more than $8 million per book. Id. For additional examples of a large liter-
ary estate, see KERNAN, supra note 10, at 109.
157 See supra note 154.
" The most well-known misappropriation decision is International News Ser..
v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1928), in which the Supreme Court announced a
federal general common law "quasi-property" right in the dissemination of informa-
tion to prevent defendant from free riding on news reports published by plaintiff.
The Supreme Court declared:
[D]efendant ... admits that it is taking material that has been acquired
by complainant as the result of organization and the expenditure of la-
bor, skill, and money, and which is salable by complainant for money,
and that defendant in appropriating it and selling it as its own is en-
deavoring to reap where it has not sown, and by disposing of it to news-
papers that are competitors of complainant's members is appropriating to
itself the harvest of those who have sown.
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sunably can sue a movie producer who advertises a mystery
movie under the same title as one of her books without her
permission. Thus, the elimination of derivative rights does not
necessarily reduce income from derivative markets.
Second, derivative rights may actually reduce the produc-
tion of expressive works because they inhibit creation of appro-
priative works by raising their production cost. For example,
Jeffrey Koons, in order to make a sculpture of a copyrighted
image, must incur transactional costs of negotiating copyright
licenses in addition to paying licensing fees. Sara
Charlesworth, who rephotographs copyrighted photographs,
reports paying roughly one-fifth of her net profit in licensing
fees alone."9 For artists who incorporate a large number of
copyrighted works in a single work,"' the total overhead is
likely to become too high to proceed with creation. For those
who cannot afford to obtain a license, the threat of litigation is
likely to scare at least some of them from engaging in appro-
priative creative activities."'
Third, broad derivative rights encourage rent seeking in a
certain segment of creative markets."= Some works are more
likely to lead to derivative profits than others. For example, a
successful animation film targeted toward younger audiences
would generate revenues from many sources-videos, books,
toys, computer games, music, and television shows. On the
other hand, a book on advanced calculus is unlikely to open
any derivative markets. As a result, reasonable investors in
Id- at 239-40. This case has come to stand for a general common law property
right against misappropriation of commercial value. Douglas G. Baird, Common
Law Intellectual Property and the Legacy of International News Service v. Associat-
ed Press, 50 U. CHL L. REV. 411 (1983).
... Carlin, supra note 6, at 137 n.128.
"6 Vanderkny supra note 91 (stating that it is not uncommon for a single
music piece to combine digital samples from as may as 100 sources).
..1 For example, the threat of litigation has affected the "Neo-Pop" movement
lead by a group of artists in New York's East Village. See Carlin, supra note 6, at
126-27. A Neo-Pop artist "recycles" cartoon characters to make artistic statements.
In certain cases, artists were forced to stop using the cartoon characters. Carlin,
supra note 6, at 126-27.
" By rent seeking, I mean that companies and individuals will invest resources
to create copyrightable works to seek economic rent due to derivative rights. See
generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic
Perspective, 30 J. LAW & ECON. 265, 267-68 (1987); Kenneth W. Dam, The Eco-
nomic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 247, 247-53 (1994).
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creative works would direct more money into those works with
a larger potential for derivative revenues. Given large media
companies' tendency to invest in more conventional works with
large audience appeal,63 broad derivative rights would lead
to further concentration of investment in mainstream expres-
sions, and thus reduce expressive diversities, while encourag-
ing wasteful rent seeking.'"
Fourth, Professor Lunney points out that broad derivative
rights encourage overproduction of expressive works at the
expense of more socially valuable nonexpressive works.165 In
a competitive market, those who invest in a nonexpressive
work can charge a price that is close to a marginal cost. Those
who invest in an expressive work, on the other hand, recover
full value of their works. This discrepancy in the size of recov-
ery may lead to allocative inefficiency by drawing resources
away from socially valuable nonexpressive works to socially
less valuable expressive works.
What is most disturbing from a viewpoint of economic
efficiency is that derivative rights suppress Post-Modern art
and new forms of creative activities using the digital technolo-
gy. Post-Modern artists appropriate in order to challenge the
traditional notion of originality and authorship upon which the
value of fine art typically has been judged.166 Their purpose
of appropriation is not parasitic but rather to create a new
work, which copyright law is supposed to encourage. Moreover,
appropriation is rapidly becoming an integral part of a much
wider range of creative activities due to the advancement in
digital technology. Consequently, the cost of derivative rights,
measured in terms of suppression of the production of new
"6 Paul DiMaggio, Market Structure, the Creative Process, and Popular Culture:
Toward an Organizational Reinterpretation of Mass-Culture Theory, 11 J. POPULAR
CULTURE 436, 440 (1977) (noting that larger, established media organizations have
poorer records than do smaller, independent firms in providing innovative prod-
ucts).
16 See Diane Crane, The Production of Culture: Media and the Urban Arts 55-
75 (1992) (canvassing studies that link production of mainstream expression with
increased concentration of media ownership).
6 Lunney, supra note 146, at 655.
1 Carlin, supra note 6, at 103-105, 108-111. See generally BENJAMIN, THE
WORK OF ART IN THE AGE OF MECHANICAL REPRODUCTION, ILLUMINATIONS (1969)
(arguing that mass reproduction of art works functioned as a progressive force
that provided the means through which the traditional authority and "aura" of fine
art was undermined, giving rise to appropriative creative activities).
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works based on appropriation, has increased significantly.
Admittedly, Congress is free to conclude that these appropria-
ive works are worth less than nonappropriative works and
thus copyright law should discourage their creation. However,
when Congress decided to grant broad derivative rights in
1976, both appropriative art activities and digital technology
were still in their infancy and thus the cost of derivative rights
was significantly less.
2. The Delayed Publication Factor
Landes and Posner argue that broad derivative rights
reduce the possibility that a copyright owner would delay the
publication of the original in order to prevent others from free-
riding on it." For example, without derivative rights, anyone
can make a drama or movie based on a published novel. Thus,
a novelist may delay the publication of her novel until the com-
pletion of a drama and movie in order to protect income from
the derivative markets.
This argument, even if valid, is applicable only to a rela-
tively small segment of creative works. For most authors, the
prospect of earning income from derivative works is so small
that it would be unwise to withhold the publication of a work
for a remote possibility of licensing it. Furthermore, it seems
as persuasive to argue that broad derivative rights delay the
production of both original and derivative works. By eliminat-
ing competitions in derivative markets, broad derivative rights
may encourage a copyright owner to "sit on" her derivative
rights. She may also manipulate a timing of the release of
derivative works to maximize her profits. The prospect of large
profits from derivative works may cause a copyright owner to
spend more time and money than necessary in making her
original work, delaying the publication of the original. A copy-
right owner who earns large profits from derivative markets
would have little economic pressure to produce a next work,
delaying the production of subsequent works.
"' Landes & Posner, supra note 146, at 354-55.
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3. The Transactional Cost Factor
Professor Sterk points out that Landes and Posner are
incorrect in arguing that granting derivative rights reduces
transactional cost by reducing the number of parties with
whom a second comer needs to negotiate in creating a deriva-
tive work.'68 Landes and Posner state that without derivative
rights, a person who wants to translate a novel must negotiate
with both the author of the novel as well as a person who
made an earlier translation.'69 Their conclusion is mistaken,
because without derivative rights, this second comer does not
have to negotiate with anyone in order to independently create
a translation.
Contrary to Landes and Posner's conclusion, derivative
rights increase transactional costs, because derivative rights
increase the number of parties with whom an author needs to
negotiate. For example, if C wants to make a derivative work
based on B's derivative work, which is based on A's original
work, and if C wants to use original expressions of both A's
and B's, C would probably have to negotiate with both. With-
out derivative rights, however, C would not have to negotiate
with anyone as long as C creates a new work. By increasing
the number of parties with whom C must negotiate, derivative
rights would also increase the possibility of the holdout prob-
lem,7° further raising transactional costs.
Moreover, the enforcement cost of derivative rights is like-
ly to rise as digital technology permeates our daily lives. Digi-
tal technology has made it possible not only for Post-Modern
artists but also for anyone with a computer and modem to
create a derivative work by manipulating a digital copy of a
copyrighted work and publishing it over the Web. The prolifer-
ation derivative works on personal Web pages indicates the
16 Sterk, supra note 146, at 1215-16.
... Landes & Posner, supra note 146, at 355.
1. See generally Richard A. Epstein, Holdouts, Externalitites, And The Single
Owner: One More Solute To Ronald Coase, 36 J. LAW & ECON. 553 (1993) (stating
that "the central theme of all legal institutions becomes the effort to control trans-
action costs that impede voluntary exchange").
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wide-spread popularity of such creative activities. The en-
forcement of derivative rights in this kind of environment
would involve expensive monitoring and litigation."'
B. The Labor-Desert Theory'
The labor-desert theory is based on the premise that each
individual has a property interest in her own person and the
labor of her own body. Thus, whenever an individual joins her
labor with a resource that previously belonged to mankind in
common; the individual laborer acquires a private property
right in that resource, at least so long as enough, and as good
of the resources is left to other potential laborers.' 4
The labor-desert theory had a strong influence on early
' The Software Publisher's Association ("SPA!) has been very active in enforc-
ing copyright over the Web. It uses both litigation and lobbying to strengthen
protection of copyrights in the Web. SPAs web page at <http://vww.spa.org> pro-
vides useful information on its anti-piracy activities.
17 In order to enforce derivative rights in the new digital media, the copyright
industries have been active in developing a technological solution. For example,
the Association of American Publishers views the development of technological
means to protect copyright on the Web as its first priority. Carol A. Risher, Asso-
ciation of American Publishers Addresses Members' Needs for Enabling Technology,
in PROCEEDINGS, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE FOR CONTEN. FORMJ ON TECHNoLOGY-
BASED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MIANAGEMENT 61 (Brian Kahin & Kate Arms eds.,
1996). See also Branko Gerovac & Richard J. Solomon, Protect Revenues, Not Bits:
Identify Your Intellectual Property, in 1 IIA PROCEEDING, at 49 (describing a
work-in-progress by the television and motion picture community for digital imag-
ing header to protect intellectual property); Sergiu S. Simmel & Ivan Godard, Me-
tering and Licensing of Resources: KaIa's General Purpose Approach, in 1 RMA
PROCEEDING, supra note 140, at 81 (describing a system that enables pay-per-user
and pay-per-use licensing); Gary N. Griswold, A Method for Protecting Copyright
on Networks, in 1 IMA PROCEEDING, supra note 140, at 169 (describing a system
to control accessluse of information that has been delivered to customer machines
over a wider area network). Cf Richard Stallman, The Right to Read, COMA. OF
ACM, Feb. 1997, at 85 (warning against copyright industries' use of technology to
restrict the public's right to read).
Ir' See generally Wendy Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property
and Restitutional Impulse, 78 VA. L. REv. 149 (1992); Wendy Gordon, An Inquiry
into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency, Consent, and Encour-
agement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343 (1989); Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natu.
ral Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 517, 546-47 (1990)
(tracing the impact of Lockeean philosophy on copyright law).
174 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Thomas L Cook ed., 6th ed.
1947) (1764).
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copyright decisions.175 For example, it was used to justify
granting copyright in factual works, such as maps.176 As late
as 1954, the Supreme Court in Mazer v. Stein, stated that:
"Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities deserve
rewards commensurate with the services rendered."
177
The extent of the influence of the labor-desert theory in
the current copyright system is not clear. Professor Jane
Ginsburg states that the influence of the labor-desert theory
had diminished by the end of the nineteenth century.1 78 In
1991, the Supreme Court declared that labor alone did not
entitle one to copyright protection and made originality a con-
stitutional requirement of copyright. 7  Furthermore, the size
of reward under the current copyright system has little to do
with the amount of labor used. For example, Patricia Cornwell
signed a contract last year under which she earns eight million
dollars per Scarpetta mystery, which is over 1,000 times more
than what she earned for her first Scarpetta mystery. It is very
doubtful that Ms. Cornwell plans to put in proportionately
more labor on her eight million dollar mystery. Likewise, the
amount of labor cannot explain why a popular writer like Ms.
Cornwell deserves so much more money compared to those
writers whose works have less popular appeal. 8
The vitality of the labor-desert theory under the current
copyright system is of little relevance as far as derivative
rights are concerned, for it alone cannot justify derivative
175 See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 132, at 1875-76 (quoting comments by George
Tcknor Curtis and Eaton S. Drone, supporting labor as justification for copyright
grant).
... Justice Story wrote: "A man has a right to the copy-right of a map of a
state or country, which he has surveyed or caused to be complied from existing
materials, at his own expense, or skill, or labor, or money." Emerson v. Davies, 8
F. Cas. 615, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4,436).
'77 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
... Ginsburg, supra note 132, at 1890.
17' Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
Note that in late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, originality was equat-
ed with industriousness. For example, Eaton S. Drone stated that: "[Tihe true test
of originality is whether the production is the result of independent labor or of
copying." Ginsburg, supra note 132, at 1876 (quoting EATON S. DRONE, A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL PRODUCTIONS IN GREAT BRITAIN AND
THE UNITED STATES 209 (1879)).
'" Another good example is the amount of wealth that Microsoft's operating
system has generated. This amount probably has a closer connection to IBM's
decision to use Microsoft's operating system than the amount of labor expended.
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rights. First, it does not specify how much a copyright owner
can claim based on her labor. Second, it does not explain why
the copyright owner should receive benefits from the labor of a
second comer who adds to what the copyright owner created.
The labor-desert theory does not tell us how far derivative
rights should extend. If I cultivate an unoccupied field to grow
corn, there is little doubt under the labor-desert theory that I
deserve to claim a property right over whatever I harvest from
the field. Suppose that I also made a trail from my house in a
village to my field. Assuming that I made this trail with a plan
of expanding my corn field in mind, does my building of this
trail give me a property right over the uncultivated land that
is adjacent to the trail? Or can a second comer claim a proper-
ty right over the uncultivated land as long as she cultivates it
before I do without using my trail? If I do deserve the adjacent
uncultivated land, how far from the trail does my property
right extend?
Moreover, the labor-desert theory does not give a guidance
on how to resolve conflicting property claims. The current copy-
right law favors labor of the copyright owner over that of an
appropriator.'' Under the expansive definition of derivative
rights given in section 101 of the 1976 Act, the copyright owner
would have a claim over the appropriator's labor even when
the appropriator uses the copyrighted work as merely an inspi-
ration. The labor-desert theory fails to explain why it is just to
grant the copyright owner a property right over something that
she herself did not labor upon.
... However, during the nineteenth century, 'new toil and talenV' exerted by the
second comer gave her "new property rights," even when she expends her labor on
a predecessor's efforts. See Webb v. Powers, 29 F. Cas. 511, 517 (C.C. Mass.
1847) (No. 17, 323) (inquiring whether the second comer's appropriations from the
first author were "characterized by enough [that is) new or improved, to indicate
new toil and talent, and new property and rights in the last compiler).
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C. The Personality Theory'
The premise underlying the personality theory is that to
achieve proper self-development an individual needs some
control over resources in the external environment."l ' Deriva-
tive rights encourage self-development by enabling an author
to control the use of her work, upon which an author is deemed
to have projected her personality.'
Initially, the personality theory had little influence in the
Anglo-American copyright system. In England, copyright began
as a publisher's right, with little concern for the author. Ac-
cording to Professor Patterson, the notion of an author's right
first surfaced when drafting the Statute of Anne in 1709, some
150 years after the initial copyright law." 5 Even then, the
motive was to use such appeals to protect an author's
personhood so as to advance publishers' economic interests.1 86
In fact, the early Anglo-American copyright law only focused
on preventing piracy, and thus did little to protect an author's
personality interests against exploitative uses."7
Courts started to recognize the connection between an
author's work and her personhood by the late nineteenth cen-
tury. In a 1903 Supreme Court decision, Justice Holmes articu-
lated the connection as follows:
The copy is the personal reaction of an individual upon nature. Per-
sonality always contains something unique. It expresses its singular-
ity even in handwriting, and a very modest grade of art has in it
12 See generally Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L.
REV. 957 (1982); Carl H. Settlemyer III, Between Thought and Possession: Artists'
"Moral Rights" and Public Access to Creative Works, 81 GEO. L.J. 2291 (1993);
Jane G. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary Property in Revolutionary
France and America, 64 TUL. L. REV. 991 (1990); Martin A. Roeder, The Doctrine
of Moral Right: A Study in the Law of Artists, Authors, and Creators, 53 HARV. L.
REV. 554 (1940); Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARe.
L. REv. 193, 207 (1890) (stating that copyright and privacy should both be seen
"as a part of the more general right to the immunity of the person-the right to
one's personality").
18 Radin, supra note 182, at 957; Roeder, supra note 182, at 556-57.
18 Radin, supra note 182.
1 PATTERSON, supra note 103, at 14.
1 PATTERSON, supra note 103, at 14. Publishers also appealed to author's
rights to advance their interests in the courts. See, e.g., Millar v. Taylor, 98 Eng.
Rep. 201 (KB. 1769).
17 See supra note 185 and acoompanying text.
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something irreducible, which is one man's alone. That something he
may copyright unless there is a restriction in the words of the
act.18
According to Professor Ginsburg, courts became more will-
ing to protect personhood of an author by granting derivative
rights as they began viewing expressive works in an idealized
manner."8 9 The Supreme Court first detached a work from a
medium of expression, announcing that "the word 'book', as
used in the statute, is not to be understood in the technical
sense of a bound volume, but any species of publication which
the author selects to embody his literary product."" ' Next, it
went on to detach a work from a particular form of expression
of the author's elaborated ideas.'9 Once an expressive work
became idealized by detaching it from both a medium and a
particular form of expression, the courts became free to extend
the bounds of an author's control over her work beyond a ver-
batim copying in the same medium to protect the author's
personality interests in her work.'
Yet the personality theory fails to justify broad derivative
rights in two significant ways. Derivative rights are granted
even to works with little personality interest. In addition, the
theory does not explain why the law should favor personality
interests of the copyright owner over those of an appropriator,
even when the appropriator projects considerably more per-
sonality interests than the copyright owner.
If personality interests are what derivative rights aim to
protect, derivative rights under the current copyright system
are too broad in that they are granted to works with virtually
" Bleinstein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903) (reject-
ing defendant's challenge to the copyrightability of commercial art for its lack of
aesthetic merit).
*" Ginsburg, supra note 132, at 1886-88.
19 Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82 (1899).
Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55 (1911) (holding that a film based on
the novel Ben Hur infringed author's right to dramatize).
19 Professor Ginsburg elaborates this point as follows:
[The] deincorporealization conception-well understood in modern copy-
right law-ultimately affected the scope of protection. If the authors
"product" would no longer be confined to any particular print manifesta-
tion of the work, and instead would be perceived as capable of inhabiting
any of many forms, it followed that the copyright can cover any and all
of the varying habitats. ...
Ginsburg, supra note 132, at 1887.
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no personality interests. The current copyright system grants
derivative rights to all copyrighted works under section 106(2).
Hence, a work made for hire193 presumably enjoys derivative
rights in the same manner as a work made and owned by an
artist herself. However, the degree of personality interest in
these works clearly differs. It is questionable whether an em-
ployer, which often is a corporate entity, has any personality
interest in the work made for hire. In this sense, derivative
rights belong to a wrong party, the employer, instead of the
artist who actually made the work and who presumably ex-
pressed her personality in the work.'94 Admittedly, the courts
do make some adjustment in terms of the extent of derivative
rights depending the types of work.' Similarly, Congress,
when expanding the protection of personhood interests by
passing the Visual Artists Rights Act ("VARA") in 1990,96
distinguished among works of visual art by denying protection
to some works of visual art such as works made for hire or
mass produced works.'97 If personality interests are what jus-
Section 101 of the 1976 Act provides that a work is "for hire" under two
sets of circumstances:
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her em-
ployment; or
(2) a work specifically ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution
to a collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual
work, as a translation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as an
instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an at-
las, if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by
them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). See also Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid,
490 U.S. 730 (1989) (holding that "employee" and "within the scope of his or her
employment" in the 1976 Act definition of work made for hire refers to "a hired
party in a conventional employment relationship" as determined by general agency
law).
14 The Visual Artist Right Act of 1990, 17 U.S.C. § 106A (1994), which aims to
protect moral rights by granting rights of attribution and integrity to an author,
limits its coverage to "work of visual art" as defined in section 101. 17 U.S.C.
§ 101 (1994). In particular, it excludes works made for hire. See infra note 197.
1 Works that are primarily expressive, such as fictional novels or plays receive
broad copyright protection. See Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elect.
Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 617 (7th Cir. 1982). Utilitarian works, on the other hand,
receive narrow protection. See, e.g., Feist, 499 U.S. at 349 ("the copyright in a
factual compilation is thin."). Utilitarian works include works of fact such as tele-
phone directories, legal forms, and game rules.
1- 17 U.S.C. § 106A (1994).
"7 The VARA grants rights of attribution and integrity to the author of a
"work of visual art." Id. A "work of visual art" is defined as:
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tify derivative rights, such rights should not be granted indis-
criminately to all works. Instead they should be given to only
those types of works with significant personality interests.
Finally, the personality theory alone does not explain why
copyright law should prefer personality interests of the copy-
right owner over that of an appropriator. After all, an appro-
priator adds aspects of her personality to a derivative work.
Justice Holmes told us that personality exists even in "hand-
writing" and "a very modest grade of art.""' Then, why does
copyright law provide expansive protection of personality inter-
ests to the copyright owner, while ignoring personality inter-
ests of an appropriator? One explanation for this preference is
that the copyright owner generally expresses "more"
personhood than the appropriator. However, there are cases
where appropriator's personhood interests in a derivative work
far outweigh those of the copyright owner. For example, when
an appropriator greatly transforms the original to the point
that the original is barely recognizable in a new work, it is not
clear why this appropriation causes harm to the copyright
owner's personality interests in the first place. Moreover, if the
appropriator invests a considerable amount of personality
(1) a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture, existing in a single copy, in a
limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively
numbered by the author, or, in the case of a sculpture, in multiple cast,
carved, or fabricated sculptures of 200 or fewer that are consecutively
numbered by the author and bear the signature or other identifying
mark of the author;, or
(2) a still photographic image produced for exhibition purposes only, ex-
isting in a single copy that is singed by the author, or in a limited edi-
tion of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered
by the author.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). It excludes the followings from a 'work of visual art":
(A) (I) any poster, map, globe, chart, technical drawing, diagram, model,
applied art, motion picture or other audio-visual work, book, magazine,
newspaper, periodical, data base, electronic information service, electronic
publication, or similar publication;
(ii) any merchandising item or advertising, promotional, descriptive, cover-
ing, or packaging material or container;,
(B) any work made for hire; or
(C) any work not subject to copyright protection under this title.
IdL
Bleinstein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903) ('Per-
sonality contains something unique. It expresses its singularity even in handwrit-
ing, and a very modest grade of art has in it something irreducible, which is one
man's alone.").
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interests in a new work, why does the law deny protection of
personality interests of the appropriator against the exploita-
tion by the others, including the first author?
D. The Romantic Authorship Theory'99
A Romantic author is someone who creates a work that is
utterly new and original by using her creative genius. In the
eighteenth century, the notion of a Romantic author came to
play an important role in resolving a question of property
rights in intellectual works:
Eighteenth-century theorists departed from this compound model of
writing in two significant ways. They minimized the element of
craftsmanship (in some instances they simply discarded it) in favor
of the element of inspiration, and they internalized the source of
that inspiration. That is, inspiration came to be regarded as emanat-
ing not from outside or above, but from within the writer himself.
"Inspiration" came to be explicated in terms of original genius, with
the consequence that the inspired work was made peculiarly and
distinctively that product-and the property-of the writer."9
The Romantic authorship theory continues to play an
important role in copyright law,' -° and courts have relied on
19 Michel Foucault, What is an Author?, in TEXTUAL STRATEGIES: PERSPECTIVES
IN POsT-STRuCTURALIST CRITIcIsm 141 (Josue V. Harari ed., 1979); Boyle, supra
note 13, at 1463-66; Peter A. Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamor-
phoses of 'Authorship", 1991 DUKE L.J. 455 ; See Martha Woodman, On the Au-
thor Effect: Recovering Collectivity, 10 CARnOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 279 (1992);
Keith Aoki, Authors, Inventors and Trademark Owners: Private Intellectual Proper-
ty and the Public Domain Part I, 18 CoLuM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 1 (1993); For the
linkage between Romantic authorship and intellectual property in England, see
Mark Rose, The Author as Proprietor: Donaldson v. Becket and the Genealogy of
Modern Authorship, 23 REPRESENTATIONS 51 (1988). The notion of Romantic au-
thorship has strongly influenced the development of intellectual property law in
Continental Europe. See Martha Woodmansee, The Genius and the Copyright: Eco-
nomic and Legal Conditions of the Emergence of the "Author", 17 EIGHTEENTH-
CENTURY STUD. 425 (1984) (Germany); Carla Hesse, Enlightenment Epistemology
and the Laws of Authorship in Revolutionary France, 1777-1793, 30 REPRESENTA-
TIONS 109 (1990) (France).
2"0 Woodmansee, supra note 199, at 427.
201 See Aoki, supra note 199 (finding that the courts have repeatedly "reaffirmed
the traditional model of clearly individual, transformative and original authorship"
over serial, collective or collaborative authorship). But see Marci A. Hamilton, Ap-
propriation Art and the Imminent Decline in Authorial Control Over Copyrighted
Work, 42 J. CORP. SOC-f 93 (1994) (stating that the importance of authorship in
copyright system has been exaggerated); Robert H. Rotstein, Beyond Metaphor:
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it to justify the granting of copyrights." 2 Similarly, the courts
have used the Romantic authorship theory to condemn an
appropriator, whom the courts view as a thief who stole some-
one else's work rather than making her own. 0 s
When one combines the Romantic authorship theory with
either labor or personality theory, derivative rights arguably
make sense, because the Romantic authorship theory provides
justification for preferring a copyright owner over an appropri-
ator,' and because derivative rights can be considered nec-
essary to encourage Romantic authorship, which courts view as
a more socially desirable form of authorship."'3
The Romantic authorship theory provides justification for
"breaking a tie" between a copyright owner and an appropria-
tor when they have conflicting property right interests over a
derivative work. In the preceding sections, it was argued that
neither the labor nor personality theory alone justifies prefer-
ence of labor or personhood of the copyright owner over that of
the appropriator. 6 If one accepts the view that the copyright
owner is more of a Romantic author than the appropriator and
that Romantic authorship is what copyright law should encour-
age, then it makes sense to prefer the interests of the copy-
right owner over those of the appropriator. In fact, derivative
rights can be seen as actively promoting Romantic authorship
by reducing the size of the reward to the appropriator by re-
quiring her to pay licensing fees to the copyright owner, which
in turn increases the reward to the copyright owner.
Copyright Infringement and the Fiction of the Work, 68 CHI.-KEN"T L REv. 725
(1993) (arguing that copyright law has "banished the author" as a "central animat-
ing concept").
22 See, e.g., Bleinstein, 188 U.S. at 250.
2" See, e.g., Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 303 (2d Cir. 1992); Grand Upright
Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, 780 F. Supp. 182, 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
2" Jaszi, supra note 199, at 302 (ITihe law often proves ungenerous to non-
individualists cultural productions, like folkloric works, which cannot be reimagined
as products of solitary, original authorship on the part of one or more discrete and
identifiable authors.... Such works are marginalized or become literally invisible
within the prevailing ideological frameworks of discourse in copyright. ... ").
Aoki, supra note 199, at 34 (concluding that "a particular vision of originality,
informed by the solitary, romantic author image, provides the courts with an invit-
ing rationale for granting or refusing special property rights")
20 See Aoki, supra note 199, at 3, 31-69.
See supra Part II.B and III.C.
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However, if one accepts a view that every work is deriva-
tive to some extent,2 °7 then copyright law that automatically
prefers a copyright owner over an appropriator by labeling the
former a Romantic author and the latter a plagiarist does not
necessarily reward a 'truly' Romantic author. As articulated by
Justice Story, the reality of creative activity necessitates some
reliance on earlier works:
Every book in literature, science and art, borrows, and must neces-
sarily borrow, and use much which was well known and used before.
No man creates a new language for himself, at least if he be a wise
man, in writing a book.... If no book could be subject of copy-right
which was not new and original in the elements of which it is com-
posed, there could be no ground for any copy-right in modern times,
and we should be obliged to ascend very high, even in antiquity, to
find a work entitled to such eminence. Virgil borrowed much from
Homer; Bacon drew from earlier as well as contemporary minds;
Coke exhausted all the known learning of his profession; and even
Shakespeare and Milton, so justly and proudly our boast as the
brightest originals would be found to have gathered much from the
abundant stores of current knowledge and classical studies in their
days.2
°0
Moreover, derivative works do exhibit a considerable amount of
originality and creative genius to qualify as a work of a Ro-
mantic author. There is little doubt that both T.S. Eliot and
William Shakespeare are literary geniuses, despite that fact
that many of their works are "derived" from works of oth-
ers.2 1 Similarly, critically acclaimed Post-Modern artists cre-
ate "original" works by openly appropriating copyrighted imag-
es. In contrast, some copyrighted works show little creative
originality.2
10
In fact, derivative rights, when used in a copyright in-
fringement context, set a high standard of originality-that is
the lack of substantial similarity-for defendant's work while
presuming Romantic authorship in plaintiffs work. This dis-
crepancy in the originality standard seems unjustifiable, for it
has an "unintended" effect of discouraging the creations of
20 See supra notes 6-21 and accompanying text.
20 Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4,436).
212 See supra note 14.
210 See, e.g. Bleinstein, 188 U.S. at 250; Feist, 499 U.S. at 345 ("the requisite
level of creativity is extremely low").
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some original works of authorship by labeling them as deriva-
tive even when the copied work itself shows little originality.
Consequently, the current copyright law that blindly favors the
copyright owner over the appropriator without inquiring into
the degree of originality exhibited by each author cannot be
justified under the Romantic authorship theory.
E. The Democratic Theory21'
Professor Netanel's recent article examines how the copy-
right system enhances the independent, democratic character
of society.2"2 Copyright law, which the Supreme Court has
called "the engine of free expression,2 is said to encourage
free expression by providing incentive to a sector composed of
individuals and publishers to produce and distribute creative
works. It fosters the exchange of more diverse viewpoints by
funding this sector through supports from the public rather
than the state or the elite, underwriting a robust civil demo-
cratic society.214
In Part llIA., I illustrated how derivative rights, which
grant copyright owners exclusive controls over almost all possi-
ble uses of their works, can cause the underproduction of de-
rivative works. This underproduction problem is especially
acute for those derivative works that use copyrighted works in
a way "undesirable" to their owners. The following two cases
illuminate the threat that broad derivative rights pose to a
civil democratic society by inhibiting the publication of diverse
view points.
211 See Netanel, supra note 146; Boyle, Theory of Law and Information, supra
note 146. See also Brock N. Meeks, Better Democracy Through Technology, COn-
MUNICATIONS op THE ACM, Feb. 1997, at 75; Chon, supra note 3 (advocating re-
structuring of intellectual property law to serve public interests in access to knowl-
edge in order to allow the public to retain and exercise cultural and political con-
trol in an environment of an increasingly private concentration of information).
212 Netanel, supra note 146, at 347-62 (arguing that copyrights primary goal is
not allocative efficiency, but the support of a democratic culture).
2' Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 US. 539, 558 (1985)
("it should not be forgotten that the Framers intended copyright itself to be the
engine of free expression).
" See generally Netanel, supra note 146.
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In Salinger v. Random House, Inc.,2 15 the Second Circuit
allowed J. D. Salinger to block the publication of a biography
of himself, written by Ian Hamilton. The court found that the
use of excerpts from Salinger's unpublished letters as well as
paraphrases of the contents from those letters were not fair
use and thus infringed Salinger's copyright, despite the fact
that Hamilton paraphrased all but 200 or so words. 6 In an-
other case,211 which also involved an unauthorized biography,
this time of L. Ron Hubbard, the founder of the Church of
Scientology, the Second Circuit held that but for the fact that
laches barred the copyright owner's claim, an injunction was
justified. In this case, the defendant argued that he used
Hubbard's copyrighted works to demonstrate Hubbard's char-
acter. 8
The use of derivative rights to censor free expression is
disturbing especially in the era of increasingly high concentra-
tion of the media industry.2 For example, the copyright
owner of Barney, a character in a popular PBS television show
for young children, can prohibit any derivative uses by either
refusing to license it or by charging prohibitively high licensing
fees. An artist who wants to publish an image of Barney that
terrorizes little children risks copyright infringement unless a
court classifies her use as a fair use. For most individuals, a
mere threat of litigation is enough to discontinue the publica-
tion.2 20
21. Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987).
216 See David Margolic, Whose Words Are They, Anyway?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1,
1987, at s. 7, p. 1. The biography was eventually published in 1988 by Random
House. According to Kernan, the published biography "was much shorter than its
original length and the tone was one of considerable exasperation toward
Salinger". KERNAN, supra note 10, at 93.
217 New Era Publications Int'l, ApS v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir.
1989).
218 New Era Publications Int'l, ApS v. Henry Holt and Co., Inc., 695 F. Supp.
1493, 1502 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
219 The top ten telecommunication players-Disney, Time Warner, Viacom,
Murdoch's News Corporation, Sony, TCI, Seagram (which owns MCA), westing-
house/CBS, Gannett, and GE (NBC1s corporate parent)-alone control more than
$8 billion in media industry. Jonathan Tasini, The Tele-Barons: Media Moguls
Rewrite the Law and Rewire the Country, WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 1996, at C1.
'o In the early eighties, artists in New York's East Village began the trend of
using cartoon characters to make artistic statements. Carlin, supra note 6, at 126.
Many of those who achieved some acclaim faced the threat of copyright infringe-
ment litigation by the companies that owned the cartoon imagery. Carlin, supra
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Professor Netanel, who considers the primary role of copy-
right law to be "the engine for free expression," advocates some
restrictions on broad derivative rights. In particular, he ad-
vocates limiting copyright owner's control over transformative
uses that would enhance expressive pluralism and diversity in
the society. Even among transformative uses, he would not
allow uses that would endanger incentives for creation or that
would lead to an underproduction of costly derivative works
due to what he calls a multiple-taker problem.'m
While I am in substantial agreement with Professor
Netanel's view that expansive derivative rights endanger ex-
pressive diversity, I would exclude from derivative rights more
transformative works than Professor Netanel proposes. Clear-
ly, some transformative works cause more economic damages
to a copyrighted work than others. For example, a Spanish
translation of an English novel would eliminate profit potential
from a large segment of a global market and thus reduce in-
centives without adding much to expressive diversity. As a
result, copyright law should give a copyright owner exclusive
rights to prevent the production of derivative works, including
a translation, that would severely diminish economic prospects
of the copyrighted work. On the other hand, I disagree with
Professor Netanel's contention that the ability to prevent mul-
tiple production of costly derivative works is necessary to pre-
vent the underproduction. Without any economic data, it seems
as reasonable to argue that denying copyright protection over
transformative works would encourage early production of a
costly derivative work because it acts as an incentive to be the
first one to create it in order to reap more profits. In addition,
it also encourages expressive diversity in derivative works
because makers of derivative works would attempt to avoid
direct competition by producing works that would appeal to
note 6, at 126-27. For example, Kenny Scharf, who used images from the Jetsons,
was forced to stop using characters. Carlin, supra note 6, at 127.
Netanel, supra at note 146, at 347-62.
'2 Netanel, supra at note 146, at 376-82. Professor Netanel defines a multiple
taker problem as follows: [a] multiple taker problem exists when an owner who
lacks the right to exclude will not pay a prospective taker to prevent a taking
because the owner would subsequently have to pay another prospective take not
to take, and then another and another." Netanel, supra at note 146, at 379 n.425
(citation omitted).
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different segments of the population. Thus, I would not consid-
er the cost of creating a derivative work in deciding whether
such a work should be included within derivative rights.
F. Public Expectations
The rise of appropriative creative activities signals a grow-
ing popular consensus regarding the fairness of such con-
duct.2' However, copyright law continues to disfavor appro-
priative activities considering them copyright infringement. As
the number of copyright infringement cases grows, the public
is likely to become more dissatisfied with law that is contrary
to the reality of the creative process and that constrains their
expressive freedom. Thus, more people will start questioning
the legitimacy of the copyright system.2 4
Moreover, Professor William Fisher points out that a law
that is inconsistent with the popular view leads to allocative
inefficiency, for it would shake our confidence in our ability to
guess legal rules and thus force us to either learn legal rules
before commencing a creative activity or decide against engag-
ing in the activity at all.22 Unlike rules on highway speed
limits, copyright law is much harder to learn. Even if one man-
ages to decipher the black letter law of copyright, applying it to
a particular case requires the understanding of a number of
judicially created rules, which are often in conflict. As a result,
many of us are likely to refrain from expressive and creative
activities that involve appropriations to minimize copyright
infringement liabilities, resulting in the underproduction of
creative works. Likewise, new tools for appropriative creative
See David Sterritt, Pop Culture's Patchwork of Sound and Image Drives
'Sonic Outlaw", CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, March 4, 1996, at 15; Jon Pareles, In
Pops, Whose Song Is It, Anyway?, N.Y. TI s, Aug. 27, 1989, at s. 2, p. 1;
Geraldine Norman, What's New Pusenkoff?; "Appropriation"-the Borrowing of Im-
ages of Other Artists-Is a Key Feature of Late 20th Century Art. But George
Pusenkoff, a Russian Painter, Has Been Taken to Court for Using One of Helmut
Newton's Photographic Nudes, INDEP., July, 30, 1995, at 62.
"' Edwin C. Hettinger, Justifying Intellectual Property, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 31
(1989). See, e.g., Peter H. Lewis, As Piracy Grows, the Software Industry Counter.
attacks, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1992, at s.3, p.1 2 .
' William W. Fisher HI, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 1659, 1732-33 (1988).
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activities, such as personal computers, scanners, and the
Internet, will inevitably become underutilized, increasing eco-
nomic waste.
Recently, courts have faced similar conflicts between copy-
right law and the popular consensus caused by the technologi-
cal developments, and have used the fair use doctrine to con-
form copyright law to the popular consensus.' The Supreme
Court held that private viewers' videotaping of broadcasts of
copyrighted audio-visual works for time shifting purposes con-
stituted fair use, 7 respecting a popular consensus over the
appropriateness of video recording.' In like fashion, reverse
engineering of computer programs to understand a competitors
product is accepted as a fair use.' Like home videotaping of
broadcasts,' reverse engineering was considered a necessary
and essential engineering practice within the computer soft-
ware and hardware communities long before courts endorsed
its appropriateness."
2 See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417
(1984); Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992);
Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992).
27 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
= Fisher, supra note 225, at 1732 n.309.
=' Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(recognizing that limited reverse engineering to discern the unprotectable ideas in
a computer program was a fair use); Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d
1510 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that when the disassembly of copyrighted object code
is the only means of gaining access to unprotected elements of a computer pro-
gram, such disassembly may be a fair use).
2 Even before the courts found reverse engineering to be fair use, computer
software and hardware industries have used it in an organizational context for a
variety of reasons from obtaining the information needed for rational system modi-
fication, to detecting the defects, and to recovering components for potential later
use. See, eg., Reuerse Engineering: Progress Along Many Dimensions, Communica-
tions of the ACM, May 1994, at 22. In fact, many consider reverse engineering to
be "one of the most important parts of software engineering, rather than being a
peripheral concern." Id. at 23. Since 1993, ACM and IEEE Computer Society, two
of the largest professional societies for computer software and hardware engineer-
ing, held a Working Conference on Reverse Engineering in order to bring reverse
engineering out of a closed organizational context to facilitate exchange of informa-
tion among academic and industrial researchers in this area. Id. at 23. The May
1994 Issue of Communications of the ACM presents several articles summarizing
the progress that has been made in reverse engineering, including many tools to
automate the reverse engineering process.
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Several recent disputes between an individual Web pub-
lisher and a copyright owner underscore a growing tension
between the public expectation and copyright law. 31 There
are numerous "fan sites" about musicians, movie stars, cartoon
characters, and television shows on the Web. Because they
often appropriate copyrighted works, such sites have come
under legal attacks by copyright owners despite their non-
commercial nature. For instance, Fox Broadcasting ("Fox") has
sent out approximately thirty letters warning private Web
publishers against the appropriation of copyrighted materials
used in their popular television shows like "The X-Files," "The
Simpsons," and "Millennium."232  When Fox forced Gil
Trevizo, a college student, to take down his "Millennium" Web
site,13 it drew strong public criticism. 34 Fans of Fox's other
popular show, "The X-Files" organized a group to fight for the
survival of Web sites on "The X-Files." 3 '5 Not surprisingly,
there are numerous Web sites devoted to "Star Trek," among
which only one site is authorized by its copyright owner,
Viacom.236 Since Viacom sent a warning to one of the unau-
221 The following two Internet sites keep track of disputes between a private
Web publisher and a copyright own-
er.<http:J/www.muchmusic.com/muchmusic/cyberfax/trademark.html> (maintained by
an individual); <http:/www.eff.org> (maintained by the Electronic Frontier Founda-
tion, go to their "What's Hot in IntProp").
' Laurent Belsie, Web War: Hollywood Tangles with Fans On-Line Sites,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 17, 1996, at Features. See also Amy Harmon, Web
Wars: Companies Get Tough on Rogues; Studios and Fortune 500 Firms Target
Unauthorized Internet Sites That Feature Their Products. Crackdown Affects Fans
as Well as Foes, L.A TIMES, Nov. 12, 1996, Al; Edward A. Mazza II, Copyright
Holders Wage War On Net, DAILY YOIURI, Jan. 21, 1997, at 9.
's Fox's attorney stated that Trevizo's site competed with Fox's "Millennium"
site, on which Fox spent more than $100,000. Harmon, supra note 232.
2" Harmon, supra note 232. One user described the problem as follows:
It is becoming clear that this is not just a matter of either copyright or
trademark ... but that Fox execs want complete and total control over
how every facet of their company is portrayed on the Internet .... They
have thus far shown themselves unwilling to compromise .... If there
will be no peaceful compromise, we are willing to fight.
Harmon, supra note 232.
' Harmon, supra note 232. The group is called "XFACTOR-X-Philes for Abol-
ishing Censorship Threatening Our Rights" and it has a slogan "Free Speech Is
Out There." Harmon, supra note 232.
"6 Mitch Gitman, Trek Tech; CD-ROMS and a Huge Presence in Cyberspace
Open Ups Worlds Where No Fan Has Gone Before, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE,
Aug. 31, 1995, at C1.
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thorized Web sites, http/www.loskene.com, in December,
1996, there have been numerous calls to fight against Viacom's
action. 7 Copyrighted works of Disney have also been "ex-
ploited" by over 6,000 Web pages and numerous on-line discus-
sion groups,"5 with some of them providing free adult enter-
tainment using Disney characters. 9
Derivative rights, which prohibit even a small appropria-
tion of a copyrighted material, clearly stand in the way of the
Web phenomena described above. As copyright owners become
more diligent in asserting their copyrights over the Web, this
discrepancy between copyright law and the public expectation
is likely to become more real to the public. The increase in the
number of users' groups, which advocate reforming copyright
law to address users' interests, indicates that users may not
quietly give in until copyright law conforms to their expecta-
tions.'
IV. PROPOSALS TO RESTRICT DERIVATIVE RIGHTS
In Part I, I argued that derivative rights under the cur-
rent system are too expansive to be justifiable under various
policy interests that underlie copyright law. In this section, I
consider three alternative ways of restricting derivative rights:
(1) compulsory licensing; (2) the fair use doctrine; and (3) the
reformulation of the definition of a "derivative work".
Viacom to Trek Sites: Resistance is Futie, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Dec. 21,
1996, at Business p. 1.
2 Jerry Hirsch, Disney on Net. Rated G... or X, ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER,
Jan. 23, 1997, at Al. Disney has its own official Web site, which records more
than 4 million visitors daily. Id. Disney's site is the most popular entertainment
Web site in the nation, according to POMeter, an Internet tracking agency in Port
Washington, N.Y. Id-
"Id.
2 Among many interest groups representing the user community, more active
ones include: the Electronic Frontier (http'//www.efforg), the Union for the Public
Domain (http/www.public-domain.org), and the Digital Future Coalition
(http:l www.ari.netdfcl.
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A. Compulsory Licensing"'
An appropriative artist who attempts to seek permission to
-use a copyrighted work faces two significant obstacles: money
and the difficulty of obtaining permission. Compulsory licens-
ing would get rid of the permission problem, thus alleviating
the money problem by eliminating transactional costs associat-
ed with negotiation to obtain licensing. On the other hand,
compulsory licensing would still discriminate against appropri-
ative works because licensing fees increase the cost of produc-
ing appropriative works. The increase in fees can be significant
especially for artists who appropriate from many different
sources to create a single work and for web publishers who use
copyrighted works for a non-commercial purpose.
Moreover, the compulsory licensing scheme raises at least
a few administrative problems. First, it is also not clear how
one can devise a fair pricing schedule. For an information
database, a bit-based pricing scheme-a pricing scheme based
on the amount of data taken-seems reasonable since it rea-
sonably represents the value of appropriated information. How-
ever, for literary or artistic works, the amount appropriated
does not necessarily represent the value of what is appropriat-
ed. In fact, given the nature of these works, it is highly unlike-
ly that one could devise a mechanical pricing scheme that
would fairly capture a value of what is taken. Second, it is not
easy to decide whether a work at issue is derivative or original
because courts have not given clear guidance on when a work
is deemed to be derivative. Under the compulsory licensing
scheme, would an artist need to pay licensing fees if she thinks
her work looks similar to a work by another artist? What hap-
pens if the artist finds another work by B that is similar to a
work by A? Does she need to obtain licensing from both? Third,
most people will have little incentive to comply with the com-
pulsory licensing scheme. It is unlikely that an individual will
"get caught," unless she is a well-known artist. Given a very
2 Professor Ginsburg advocates subjecting only low authorship work to compul-
sory license. Ginsburg, supra note 132, at 1924-27, 1938. Examples of low author-
ship works include telephone directories and compilations. Ginsburg, supra note
132, at 1870. Excluded from her proposal on compulsive licensing are high author-
ship works, which are characterized by authorial presence. Ginsburg, supra note
132 at 1870.
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small likelihood of becoming accused of copyright infringement,
it seems reasonable for her to ignore the licensing payment
issue to reduce the production cost.'
Finally, the compulsory licensing scheme can be used by
the copyright industries to further restrict users' rights. Courts
have taken into account the availability of means to enforce
copyright in deciding whether a particular use is a fair use.
'Any effective compulsory licensing scheme in the digital
era would require capacity to monitor file transfer activities
and to control access to files once downloaded on to users'
computers. The same mechanism can be applied to charge fees
for browsing and to constrain even private use of copyrighted
materials.'
B. The Fair Use Doctrine
Several commentators have recommended the application
of the fair use doctrine to promote appropriative creative activ-
ities.' Arguably, such an application is consistent with pre-
cedent, as courts have used the fair use doctrine to curb the
monopoly given to a copyright owner in order to serve greater
public interests. 6 Additionally, appropriative activities can
be analogized to criticism, commentary or parody, in the sense
" See Daniel Kabneman & Amos Tversky, Conflict Resolution: A Co.gnitiue
Perspective, in INTRODUCTION TO BARREERS TO CONFUCT RESOLUTIONS 54, 59 (Ken-
neth Arrow et al eds., 1995) (describing risk and loss aversive behaviors).
2,3 American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994).
Compare American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1, 2-9, 24-26
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (Leval, J.) (discussing the rise of practicality of the non-profit
Copyright Clearance Center, which offers two types of services: (1) Transactional
Reporting Service, (fees based on number of copies made); and (2) Annual Autho-
rization Service (Blanket License based on photocopy survey)), with Texaco, 60
F.3d at 936-37 (Jacobs J., dissenting) (arguing availability of the CCC licensing
scheme should not be considered in the analysis of the fourth fair use factor).
. See also supra note 170.
24 See Ames, supra note 6 (stating that the fair use doctrine should be used to
foster modern appropriative art as a valid form of criticism and comment); Carlin,
supra note 6 (arguing for the use of the fair use doctrine to foster appropriative
art); Sonya del Peral, Comment, Using Copyrighted Visual Works in Collage: A
Fair Use Analysis, 54 ALB. L. REV. 141 (1989) (arguing for fair use defense for
use of copyrighted images in collage). See also Jane C. Ginsburg, Domestic and
International Copyright Issues Implicated in the Compilation of a Multimedia Prod-
uct, 25 SETON HALL L. REv. 1397, 1404-07 (1995) (outlining issues raised in ap-
plying the fair use doctrine to appropriative use under multimedia environment).
24 See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
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that appropriators are likely to face difficulties in obtaining
licensing and that costs of licensing would make appropriations
prohibitively expensive for those artists who engage in a style
of art that combines works from many sources.'
One major advantage of using the fair use doctrine is that
it would allow courts to "optimize" copyright protection so that
only socially beneficial appropriative uses are excused. Using
the four fair use factors, courts are free to disfavor a clearly
parasitic appropriative use, while excusing a highly creative
appropriative use. 8 On the other hand, the extension of the
fair use doctrine to appropriative works is likely to further
strain the doctrine, which many find unpredictable, if not in-
comprehensible."5 Because the statutory factors disfavor ap-
plications of the fair use to appropriative works," ° the rein-
terpretation of the fair use doctrine is inevitable, potentially
increasing the unpredictability and complexity of the doctrine.
Moreover, the fact specific nature of the fair use doctrine
makes it undesirable for artists who must make business deci-
sions."' An artist cannot rely on any one favorable court rul-
ing, since a slight change in fact can potentially change the
outcome even for the same court. Thus, the fair use doctrine
would leave an artist wondering which side of the boundary
between fair use and infringement her work falls under. In
this sense, copyright law would continue to discourage artists
who fear litigation from engaging in appropriative art activi-
ties.
24? Wendy Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure; A Structural and Economic
Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUMI. L. REV. 600 (1982)
(arguing that the courts should employ fair use to permit uncompensated transfers
that the market is incapable of effectuating).
240 See supra notes 68-76 and accompanying text.
249 See generally Weinreb, supra note 74 (discussing confusions surrounding fair
use despite the 1976 enactment of the doctrine and Supreme Court decisions deal-
ing with the doctrine).
2o See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
21 See, e.g., Weinreb, supra note 74, at 1138 ("[Flair use has historically been
and ought to remain ... an exemption from copyright infringement for uses that
are fair. What is fair is . . .fact-specific and resistant to generalization . . ").
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C. Redefining Derivative Work
I propose revising the definition of a "derivative work" as
follows:
A "derivative work" is either (1) a work based significantly upon one
or more pre-existing works, such that it exhibits little originality of
its own or that it unduly diminishes economic prospects of the works
used; or (2) a translation, sound recording, art reproduction, abridg-
ment, and condensation.
Under this definition, most transformative works would
not be considered derivative. For example, Koons' sculpture
would not be a derivative work of Rogers' portrait although it
is significantly based on Rogers' work, because it does not un-
duly diminish economic prospects of Rogers' work.' Similar-
ly, most appropriative activities by Post-Modern artists would
be noninfringing for the same reason. Additionally, most digi-
tal sampling would be noninfringing, for a resulting work is
not "based significantly" upon the works taken. The noncom-
mercial use of copyrighted images by a Web publisher would
not be infringing as long as it does not compete with the mar-
ket of the originals. Even if a Web page affects the market of
the originals, it would escape an infringement charge if appro-
priation is insubstantial or if it exhibits some originality. Ap-
plying this analysis to the Twin Peaks case,' I would not
consider the defendant's book a derivative work despite the
fact that the book was substantially based on the television
show, because defendant's book cannot be considered to harm
economic prospects of the television show.
I excluded musical arrangement, dramatization,
fictionalization, and motion picture version from the list of
"derivative works" in favor of facilitating expressive diversity.
As a result, they are unlikely to be considered a "derivative
work" under the first factor, since these works require signifi-
cant creative contribution. This, however, does not leave a
novelist unprotected, for she can rely on unfair competition law
to prevent others from using her name or the title of her novel
to advertise a movie based upon her novel.
252 See supra notes 50-61 and accompanying text.
2. See supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
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This proposal aims to update copyright law to accommo-
date the reality of creative process. By narrowing the scope of
derivative rights, it aims to increase incentives to engage in
Post-Modern art activities and to exploit the new digital tech-
nology. It also recognizes Romantic authorship exhibited by an
appropriator by making an original appropriative work "non-
derivative," unless it is falls under one of five kinds of work
explicitly recognized as a derivative work. Moreover, it allows
significant room for individuals to engage in expressive activi-
ties by excluding those works that do not harm economic pros-
pects of the original. For those works for which personhood
interests are especially acute, the VARA properly extends the
needed protection. For other works, the proposal aims to bal-
ance personality interests of a copyright owner with those of
an appropriator by giving the copyright owner rights over any
parasitic taking of her work and by granting the appropriator
a right to use the copyrighted work to create a "new work."
CONCLUSION
Since derivative rights were introduced to the copyright
system in 1870, the scope of derivative rights has continued to
expand. Derivative rights are now so expansive that they allow
a copyright owner to assert control over works that have little
resemblance with her work and that have little effect on eco-
nomic prospects of her work.
While Congress and courts continued to broaden derivative
rights, the nature of creative activities changed dramatically.
As the American landscape became saturated with copyrighted
images, these images became raw materialized-we started to
use them in our creative and expressive activities. Artists who
follow Post-Modern art tradition, for example, often appropri-
ate copyrighted images to create works that challenge the
traditional notions of originality and authorship upon which
value in fine art typically has been judged. When the Internet
and digital technologies unleashed inexpensive tools for the
digital image manipulation and Web publishing, even non-
artists started using copyrighted works to engage in self-ex-
pression.
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When one considers the effects of broad derivative rights
on creative activities in light of these artistic and technological
developments, such rights seem undesirable in many respects.
Not only do they suppress expressive diversity by giving overly
broad control over copyrighted works to their owners, they also
cause allocative inefficiency by unduly inhibiting socially bene-
ficial appropriative creative activities. They also encourage
rent seeking by the copyright industries by providing
disproportionately large rewards to those who create works
with a wide popular appeal. Broad derivative rights ignore
originality and personality interests of the appropriator in
favor of the copyright owner, even when the copyright owner
has little personality interests or even when the appropriator
shows her creative 'genius' in her work. Furthermore, there are
signs of growing dissatisfaction within the public sector over
copyright law that prevents people from engaging in expressive
activities over the Internet.
Consequently, the reexamination of derivative rights is
necessary to eliminate these negative effects. I recommend
narrowing the scope of derivative rights by revising the defini-
tion of a "derivative work," in order to prevent copyright law
from inhibiting socially desirable creative activities.
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